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From the Panama Papers to the Paradise Papers, massive
document leaks in recent years have exposed trillions of dollars hidden
in small offshore jurisdictions. Attracting foreign capital with low tax
rates and environments of secrecy, a growing number of offshore
jurisdictions have emerged as major financial havens hosting thousands
of hedge funds, trusts, banks, and insurance companies.
While the prevailing account has examined offshore financial
havens as “tax havens” that facilitate the evasion or avoidance of
domestic tax, this Article uncovers how offshore jurisdictions enable
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business entities to opt out of otherwise mandatory domestic regulatory
laws. Specifically, recent U.S. Supreme Court cases restricting the
geographic scope of federal statutes create a space for commercial actors
to circumvent regulation by incorporating in offshore jurisdictions.
Under this jurisprudence, financial transactions completed through
offshore commercial entities are often, albeit not categorically, seen as
“extraterritorial” transactions beyond the reach of federal statutes. This
makes it increasingly difficult for private litigants to bring statutory
claims designed to protect the workings of the market, even in cases that
are predominantly connected to the United States. After documenting
how offshore jurisdictions enable commercial entities to opt out of federal
regulatory statutes, this Article critiques the Supreme Court’s recent
extraterritoriality jurisprudence that risks breeding a cottage industry
of private regulatory evasion.
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INTRODUCTION
By some accounts, more than $2.6 trillion in untaxed profits of
U.S. companies are held in offshore jurisdictions.1 These jurisdictions—
typically small, sun-drenched islands with minimal permanent
workforce—have transformed in recent years into major financial
havens hosting hedge funds, trusts, insurance companies, and banks.2
Bermuda, a famous vacation destination in the Atlantic Ocean with a
tiny permanent population, is now the world’s largest provider of
captive insurance—a form of sophisticated self-insurance.3 The
Cayman Islands, located in the Western Caribbean, is estimated to be
home to upward of sixty percent of the world’s hedge fund assets,4 and
reportedly the third-largest holder of U.S. government debt.5 This is a
phenomenon engineered at least in part by lawyers, judging by the
emergence of “offshore magic circle” law firms in recent years that
purport to provide full-service law practice ranging from offshore
mergers and acquisitions to offshore fund formations.6
1.
See Lynnley Browning, Trump’s Offshore Tax Plan May Mean Perk for Apple, Pfizer,
BLOOMBERG (June 12, 2017), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-12/trump-soffshore-tax-plan-may-mean-extra-perk-for-apple-pfizer [https://perma.cc/XTM5-BLLN].
2.
See RONEN PALAN, RICHARD MURPHY & CHRISTIAN CHAVAGNEUX, TAX HAVENS: HOW
GLOBALIZATION REALLY WORKS 8–10 (2010).
3.
CHRISTOPHER BRUNER, RE-IMAGINING OFFSHORE FINANCE: MARKET DOMINANT SMALL
JURISDICTIONS IN A GLOBALIZING FINANCIAL WORLD 59 (2016).
4.
Jan Fichtner, The Anatomy of the Cayman Islands Offshore Financial Center: AngloAmerica, Japan, and the Role of Hedge Funds, 23 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 1034, 1034 (2016) (“About
60% of global hedge fund assets are legally domiciled in Cayman . . . .”).
5.
Eliza Ronalds-Hannon, Hedge Funds’ Misery Exposed as Caribbean Proxies Dump
Treasuries, BLOOMBERG (June 21, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-0621/hedge-funds-misery-exposed-as-caribbean-proxies-dump-treasuries
[https://perma.cc/2TD3UFCP].
6.
See, e.g., Corporate, APPLEBY, http://www.applebyglobal.com/services/corporate.aspx (last
visited Jan. 19, 2018) [https://perma.cc/GX23-N24H]; Will Fitzgibbon, Appleby, the Offshore Law
Firm With a Record of Compliance Failures, IRISH TIMES (Nov. 5, 2017),
https://www.irishtimes.com/business/appleby-the-offshore-law-firm-with-a-record-of-compliancefailures-1.3280860 [https://perma.cc/YG76-HB6M]; see also Matthew Valencia, Storm Survivors,
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The visual paradox of tiny islands transforming into hubs of
modern finance has attracted the scrutiny of lawmakers and academics
alike, most prominently in efforts to curtail tax evasion or avoidance.7
The United States famously levies corporate tax based on a corporate
entity’s place of incorporation, incentivizing corporations operating
within the United States to “migrate” offshore by forming entities
incorporated in offshore jurisdictions.8 Permutations are endless, but
some of the most successful offshore financial havens typically levy no
corporate or capital gains tax, enabling corporate entities to purchase
legal status at a reasonable cost with little or no economic activity in
the “host” states.9
But tax is only part of the story. As this Article will show,
offshore corporate structure enables commercial entities to evade
domestic regulatory laws, particularly under recent U.S. Supreme
Court case law strengthening the presumption against applying federal
statutes in cases with both domestic and foreign facts.10 Under this
ECONOMIST (Feb. 16, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21571549-offshorefinancial-centres-have-taken-battering-recently-they-have-shown-remarkable [https://perma.cc/
HR4H-ZF2K] (assessing that offshore financial havens grew “often with help from lawyers based
in Wall Street or the City of London”).
7.
Scholars typically distinguish tax evasion, a set of illicit activities aimed at reducing
taxes, from tax avoidance, which includes various forms of legal maneuvering. See, e.g., Conor
Clarke, What Are Tax Havens and Why Are They Bad?, 95 TEX. L. REV. 59, 68 (2016) (reviewing
GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE HIDDEN WEALTH OF NATIONS: THE SCOURGE OF TAX HAVENS (2015)) (“Tax
evasion usually refers to the illegal failure to report income. Tax avoidance usually refers to
legal . . . forms of tax planning that reduce tax liability.” (footnote omitted)).
8.
Throughout this Article, I use the terms “offshore financial havens” and “tax havens”
interchangeably to describe sovereign nation states (e.g., the Bahamas) or semisovereign states
(e.g., the Cayman Islands) with lawmaking authority that attract foreign capital predominantly
through offering a combination of light regulation and low tax rates. There is no consensus around
which jurisdictions constitute “tax havens” or “offshore financial havens.” For general definitions,
see BRUNER, supra note 3, at 19–25.
9.
Id. at 19–23.
10. This line of jurisprudence is doctrinally guided by a canon of statutory interpretation
known as the presumption against extraterritoriality. See infra Section II.A. Recent Supreme
Court cases strengthening the presumption against extraterritoriality include RJR Nabisco, Inc. v.
European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659
(2013); and Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010). The trio of blockbuster
decisions in Morrison, Kiobel, and Nabisco may be a reflection of the current Supreme Court’s
aversion to adjudicating transnational cases. See Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67
STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1097–99 (2015) (considering the presumption a means for “transnational
litigation avoidance”). Or it may be part of an agenda to rein in private litigants run amok. See
Paul B. Stephen, Private Litigation as a Foreign Relations Problem, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 40, 40
(2016) (proposing that Morrison, Kiobel, and Nabisco represent the Court’s willingness to constrain
civil litigants’ ability to reach foreign actors); Carlos M. Vázquez, Out-Beale-Ing Beale, 110 AJIL
UNBOUND 68, 72 (2016) (considering Morrison, Kiobel, and Nabisco illustrative of the Court’s
hostility to private rights of action generally). Regardless of the motives, there seems to be a
consensus around the idea that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has strengthened the
presumption against applying federal statutes extraterritorially. See infra Section II.B.
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jurisprudence, financial transactions completed through offshore
commercial entities are often, albeit not categorically, seen as
“extraterritorial” transactions outside the reach of federal statutes.11
The legal residence of commercial entities matters particularly in cases
arising out of modern financial transactions that appear to defy or
simply transcend territorial borders.12
The result is an increasing difficulty faced by private litigants
bringing claims involving commercial entities registered in offshore
jurisdictions—even in cases that are predominantly connected to the
United States. Thus, for instance, in Cascade Fund, LLLP v. Absolute
Capital Management Holdings Ltd., an investment fund registered in
the Cayman Islands was able to dodge federal securities fraud claims
on grounds that the transaction was nondomestic, even while soliciting
U.S. investors within U.S. territory.13
Cascade Fund is hardly an unusual case. In addition to
intimately playing a role in the largest Ponzi scheme ever recorded in
U.S. history,14 the footprints of offshore financial havens are readily
apparent in a significant number of disputes spanning U.S. bankruptcy
law,15 the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(“RICO”) Act,16 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act

11. See infra Section II.B.
12. The domicile of commercial entities matters particularly in these cases because they serve
as tangible markers available to impute location to transactions that lack clear-cut territorial
connections to a particular jurisdiction. See infra Section II.B.3. As Professor Hannah Buxbaum
explains, many financial transactions “touch[ ] . . . multiple countries or are executed by electronic
or other means to which it is difficult to assign a location at all.” Hannah L. Buxbaum, Remedies
for Foreign Investors Under U.S. Federal Securities Law, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 167–68
(2012) [hereinafter Buxbaum, Remedies]. For instance, swap transactions, a form of contracts
involving the exchange of financial instruments, “can be between participants in two different
countries, booked in a third country, and risk-managed in a fourth country.” John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Extraterritorial Financial Regulation: Why E.T. Can’t Come Home, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1274
(2014).
13. Cascade Fund, LLLP v. Absolute Capital Mgmt. Holdings Ltd., No. 08-CV-01381-MSKCBS, 2011 WL 1211511, at *7 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2011).
14. See Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, No. AP 08-01789, 2016 WL
6900689, at *2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2016) (identifying feeder funds formed in the British
Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands as part of “the largest Ponzi scheme ever discovered”).
15. See, e.g., In re Gerova Fin. Grp., Ltd., 482 B.R. 86, 88, 89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(deferring to insolvency proceeding in Bermuda notwithstanding the acknowledgement that
“Gerova may have had significant assets in the United States”).
16. See, e.g., Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Devine, 233 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1305
(M.D. Fla. 2017) (dismissing civil RICO claim involving Cayman Islands funds notwithstanding
the alleged schemes taking place in Florida by a Florida resident).
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(“ERISA”),17 excise tax,18 and securities fraud.19
Alarmingly, the restrictive form of extraterritoriality
jurisprudence devised by recent Supreme Court cases facilitates
various forms of regulatory arbitrage,20 converting otherwise
mandatory laws of the United States into default rules under the
pretense of being governed by the laws of offshore financial havens.21
Regulatory evasion of this kind is problematic because the
mandatory nature of certain statutes that typically forbid private
entities from contractually waiving compliance with these laws may
indicate that there are costs associated with certain forms of private
misconduct that are not being fully internalized by the private parties.22
Moreover, regulatory statutes can be designed to advance certain social
policies, even when doing so conflicts with private preferences.23 It gives
little comfort that the laws of offshore financial havens are often
straightforward cases of legislative capture, whereby laws can literally

17. See, e.g., In re Meridian Funds Grp. Sec. Litig., 917 F. Supp. 2d 231, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(discussing extraterritorial application of ERISA relating to a fund organized in the Cayman
Islands).
18. See, e.g., Validus Reinsurance, Ltd. v. United States, 786 F.3d 1039, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(declining to apply federal excise tax under 26 U.S.C. § 4371 to a Bermudan reinsurance company
selling “reinsurance to insurance companies that sell policies covering risks, liabilities, and
hazards within the United States”).
19. See, e.g., In re Banco Santander Sec.-Optimal Litig., 732 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1317 (S.D. Fla.
2010) (dismissing a claim brought under Rule 10b-5 reasoning that “[t]he funds at issue in this
case are registered under the laws of the Bahamas, and the Plaintiffs purposefully went off-shore
to invest”).
20. See infra Section III.B; see also Sean J. Griffith, Substituted Compliance and Systemic
Risk: How to Make a Global Market in Derivatives Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1291, 1293 (2014)
(“In the context of derivatives, if U.S. authorities impose a harsh clearing regime, banks may shift
their derivatives operations to London or, if European and American regulation converge, to Hong
Kong or Singapore or some less highly regulated jurisdiction.”).
21. Consider, for instance, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The statute expressly
prohibits parties from avoiding liability for securities fraud through direct contractual waiver. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2012) (“Any condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or any rule or
regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void.”). But sellers
of security products soliciting U.S. investors have been able to opt out of securities fraud suits by
structuring transactions through offshore commercial entities, thereby appearing to complete
transactions offshore. See infra Section II.B.3.
22. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional
Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 231–32 (1997)
(explaining that “individual actions have external effects . . . whenever one’s actions impact on the
interests of others and one fails to account for such impact”); Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis
of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 17 (2001) (explaining that a state may be less
likely to apply a law if its violation “has adverse effects in other jurisdictions and lacks adverse
effects in the regulating jurisdiction”).
23. Ralf Michaels, Economics of Law as Choice of Law, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73, 79
(2008).
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be written by interested private actors.24 The policy danger, at its
extreme, is the emergence of a regulatory lacuna where no sovereign
regulates forms of misconduct that could have substantial impact on
society at large.
This Article strips away the largely presupposed notion that a
foreign sovereign interest is triggered by virtue of a corporate entity
maintaining its juridical residence in a foreign jurisdiction—an
assumption that is currently constraining federal courts from applying
federal statutes in cases involving offshore commercial entities.25
Importantly, prescriptive jurisdiction, a jurisdictional principle
allocating interjurisdictional authority,26 concerns lawmakers’
authority “to regulate conduct—namely, the location of the conduct.”27
A claim to regulate conduct based solely on the location of a commercial
entity is a claim bootstrapped in legal fiction that reveals little to
nothing about the location of the conduct that the law would seek to
regulate. While domicile is a concept used to impute location for the
purposes of determining the laws governing the “internal affairs” of
corporate entities,28 it need not align with the location of the actors that
the law would seek to regulate.
24. See infra Section III.C.
25. Federal courts recognize foreign sovereign interests through a variety of comity doctrines,
including the presumption against extraterritoriality, the act of state doctrine, prescriptive and
judicial comity, and foreign sovereign immunity. See William S. Dodge, International Comity in
American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2079, 2099–2119 (2015) [hereinafter Dodge,
International Comity] (extensively detailing the “many doctrines of American law [that] manifest
the principle of international comity”); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign
Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1179–80 (2007) (reviewing comity doctrines that “must be
justified in different terms because they promote American interests at the expense of comity”).
The focus of this Article is on the presumption against extraterritoriality doctrine (and prescriptive
comity to the extent that the doctrine is not already woven into the presumption against
extraterritoriality doctrine). See infra Section III.A.
26. Trachtman, supra note 22, at 2–3 (“Prescriptive jurisdiction (and its private law cognate,
choice of law) is the term used to refer to the critical question of allocation of public authority in a
horizontal interstate system.”).
27. Anthony J. Colangelo, What Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1303,
1305 (2014).
28. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (“The internal affairs doctrine is a
conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one State should have the authority to regulate
a corporation’s internal affairs . . . because otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflicting
demands.”); Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J.
CORP. L. 33, 33–34 (2006); see also Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters:
History and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 887 n.6 (1990):
The location of the corporate domicile is important because state corporation codes vary
significantly and the internal affairs of a corporation (such as what powers belong to
the board of directors, what limitations can be placed on their compensation, what kinds
of self-interested transactions can members of the board of directors enter into, what
duties must directors and officers perform, and in what ways can directors and officers
be found liable for breaches of those duties) are governed by the general corporation law
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This metaphysical assertion becomes more concrete when we
unpack what the concept of corporate domicile entails.29 Unlike
domicile of a natural person, which typically entails an individual
establishing her “headquarters” through an overwhelming territorial
relationship with a particular jurisdiction,30 domicile of commercial
entities is a form of private contract aimed at opting out of a bundle of
rules imposed by one legal regime in favor of another.31 Offshore
financial havens typically have no plausible claim to prescribe conduct
underlying financial transactions completed through offshore
commercial entities because the decisionmaking authority of relevant
commercial entities lies not in the place of incorporation but in “nerve
centers” located in “onshore” jurisdictions, including the United
States.32
Indeed, a very high percentage of corporate entities registered
in offshore financial havens are “exempted” or “excepted” entities under
of the state of incorporation—even if the corporation’s principal office, all of its physical
assets, and its principal place of business are in other states . . . .
Courts also impute situs to intangibles like corporate stock as if they are sited at the domicile of
the corporation. Aaron D. Simowitz, Siting Intangibles, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 259, 279
(2015).
29. A brief word on terminology may be useful here. By “corporate domicile,” I primarily (but
not exclusively) refer to a corporate entity’s place of incorporation. I say “not exclusively” because
firms operating in certain sectors of finance are able to (or at least claim to) locate their
headquarters in offshore financial havens without physically moving offshore. See infra Section
I.B. I use the term generically to capture the instances where corporate entities use offshore
financial havens to establish juridical residence, while leaving the nerve center—where officers or
managers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities, see infra note 32—elsewhere.
While there will inevitably be blurry lines, relatively few corporate entities incorporated in offshore
financial havens currently have significant physical presence in those jurisdictions. See infra
Section III.B.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 16 (AM. LAW INST. 1971); see also Jack L.
Goldsmith III, Note, Interest Analysis Applied to Corporations: The Unprincipled Use of a Choice
of Law Method, 98 YALE L.J. 597, 603 (1989) [hereinafter Goldsmith, Interest Analysis] (“The model
of a person having one and only one permanent and specific residence correlates fairly well with
reality.”).
31. As Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman explain, commercial legal
entities are “simply standard-form contracts among the parties who participate in an enterprise—
including, in particular, the organization’s owners, managers, and creditors.” Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000).
32. The term “nerve center” should sound familiar to teachers of civil procedure. The term is
used to determine a corporation’s principal place of business for diversity jurisdiction purposes.
See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 78 (2010) (“The phrase ‘principal place of business’ in
§ 1332(c)(1) refers to the place where a corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and
coordinate the corporation’s activities . . . .” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012))). As I will show
in Section III.A, the location of actors with decisionmaking authority is significant in deducing the
reach of a jurisdiction’s lawmaking authority. I am in no way suggesting that prescriptive
jurisdiction should generally be conflated with judicial (adjudicative) jurisdiction, the latter of
which concerns the authority over subjecting parties to a judicial process. See Colangelo, supra
note 27 (analyzing the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction).
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the laws of those jurisdictions, formed for the express purpose of doing
business outside of those jurisdictions.33 For instance, approximately
ninety-six percent of corporate entities registered to a popular
registration office in the Cayman Islands are “exempt companies,
exempt limited partnerships, and exempt trusts,”34 meaning that they
are “generally prohibited from trading within the Cayman Islands.”35
The status of these entities is important, for it reveals that a vast array
of financial dealings involving offshore entities do not implicate actual
conduct or decisionmaking taking place in offshore jurisdictions.
This is a subject that deserves wider scrutiny.36 While small
offshore jurisdictions have received sustained scrutiny by tax scholars,
they are relatively unexamined hotbeds of transnational disputes laden
with high financial stakes and fundamental theoretical questions.
Rather than seeking to give a comprehensive accounting, this Article
presents a broad sketch that future research can build on to further
shed light on the topic.
The remainder of this Article is organized in three parts. Part I
documents the dramatic rise of offshore financial havens in facilitating
private financial transactions in recent decades, becoming a central
feature of the modern economy. It frames this discussion by drawing on
tax and regulatory arbitrage scholarship and identifies an important
33. Tony Heaver-Wren & Jeremy Walton, Cayman Islands, in CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY:
A COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 87, 87 (Look Chan Ho ed., 2009) (“Most companies
incorporated in the Cayman Islands are registered as ‘exempted’ companies. Such companies are
prohibited from trading in the Cayman Islands except in furtherance of their business outside the
Cayman Islands.”); see also CONYERS DILL, BERMUDA EXEMPTED COMPANIES 5 (2016),
https://www.conyersdill.com/publicationfiles/2016_12_BDA_Bermuda_Exempted_Companies.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F6MB-FBLJ] (“Bermuda law distinguishes between those companies which are
owned predominantly by Bermudians (‘local companies’) and those which are owned
predominantly by non-Bermudians (‘exempted companies’). Only local companies are permitted to
carry on and compete for business which is in Bermuda.”).
34. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CAYMAN ISLANDS: BUSINESS AND TAX ADVANTAGES
ATTRACT
U.S.
PERSONS
AND
ENFORCEMENT
CHALLENGES
EXIST
12
(2008),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08778.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3MV-EZGP] [hereinafter GAO
REPORT].
35. Id.
36. This is a topic that will increasingly become important, both from practical and
theoretical standpoints. For most of the last two centuries, extraterritorial financial regulation
was hardly a prominent issue because the objects of financial regulation were “in large part
domestic actors, and the bulk of the risks their activities generated were local.” Chris Brummer,
Territoriality as a Regulatory Technique: Notes from the Financial Crisis, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 499,
503 (2010). Needless to say, this is no longer the case in today’s globally interconnected financial
economy. See David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial Regulation, 52 VA. J. INT’L
L. 685, 689 (2012) (explaining the import of “globalization of the financial economy” for regulators);
David Zaring, The Legal Response to the Next Financial Crisis, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 533, 537–
38 (2017) (describing the varied forms and processes that have been attempted for international
financial regulation).
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gap left in the prevailing account. Part II contains the descriptive
contribution of this piece, uncovering the previously undetected
relationship between corporate form and the extraterritorial reach of
federal regulatory statutes. In particular, this Part highlights recent
cases that predominantly (albeit not categorically) favor delimiting
federal statutes in “offshore” cases, critically assessing the impact of the
Supreme Court’s recent federal extraterritoriality jurisprudence.
Part III develops an account conceptualizing offshore corporate
structure as a species of transnational private contract, revealing the
limited utility of a corporation’s juridical home in identifying a
sovereign’s authority to regulate conduct. This Part also identifies
policy considerations that counsel against a doctrinal framework that
renders domestic regulatory statutes amenable to private choice.
I. INCORPORATION, TAXES, AND OFFSHORE CORPORATE MIGRATION
By now, most people at least have a vague intuition of what tax
havens are all about. It is, after all, a topic that has catapulted the
seemingly dry academic subject of taxation into a staple headliner of
the New York Times.37 While the earliest forms of tax havens can be
traced to the late nineteenth century,38 U.S. corporations started
experimenting with tax havens in the years following World War II,39
with their use accelerating in pace and scope in recent decades.40 This
Part explains the rise of offshore financial havens and identifies an
important gap left in the existing academic treatment of the subject.
A. Offshore Incorporation
At the heart of the various tax avoidance strategies available to
business entities today is the U.S. tax rule known as the “place of

37. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Spencer Woodman & Michael Forsythe, How Business Titans, Pop
Stars and Royals Hide Their Wealth, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2jaqe61
[https://perma.cc/2C9L-AGNP]; Andrew Ross Sorkin, When It Comes to Tax Avoidance, Donald
Trump’s Just a Small Fry, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2klNZ6E
[https://perma.cc/E3RX-6GUG].
38. Ronen Palan, Tax Havens and the Commercialization of State Sovereignty, 56 INT’L ORG.
151, 153 (2002) [hereinafter Palan, Commercialization] (tracing the “emergence of the ﬁrst modern
tax havens” to “the last years of the nineteenth century”).
39. See William W. Park, Fiscal Jurisdiction and Accrual Basis Taxation: Lifting the
Corporate Veil to Tax Foreign Company Profits, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1609, 1613 (1978) (“In the years
following World War II, many American companies established foreign subsidiaries in countries
with little or no income taxation. American insurance companies were among the greatest
offenders in the use of such ‘tax havens.’ ”).
40. BRUNER, supra note 3, at 1–5.
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incorporation” rule.41 This rule determines the corporation’s legal
location as a purely formal criterion based on the entity’s place of
incorporation,42 permitting firms headquartered or managed in the
United States to avoid U.S. taxpayer status by reincorporating in
foreign jurisdictions.43
While the more elaborate tax planning tactics span multiple
continents around the world in complex legal structuring going by
names like “the double Irish Dutch sandwich,”44 the most basic form of
corporate tax planning involves a domestic entity forming an affiliate
entity in an offshore financial haven to reduce its effective tax rate. For
instance, Houston-headquartered Cooper Industries, Inc. moved its
place of incorporation from Ohio to Bermuda, touting that it would
“reduce its effective tax rate from about 35% to 18-23%.”45 It is no
surprise, then, that the dominant offshore jurisdictions attracting
corporate relocation levy nil to zero corporate income tax.46
Incorporating in offshore jurisdictions enables corporations operating
worldwide to pay “only on U.S.-source income and offers other
opportunities to shelter U.S. income through transfer pricing, income
stripping, and other techniques.”47
The widespread practice of corporate inversion—a series of
complex transactions undergone by a U.S. corporation to reincorporate
in a foreign jurisdiction—suggests that the trend toward offshore
corporate migration will continue.48 In my count of recently announced
inversion transactions tracked by Professor Eric Talley,49 Bermuda and
41. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) (West 2018). This need not be the rule. Several prominent
jurisdictions around the world peg corporate residency to the location of corporate headquarters
for tax purposes. See ROBERT COUZIN, CORPORATE RESIDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 25
(2002).
42. See Omri Marian, Home-Country Effects of Corporate Inversions, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3
(2015) (“[U]nder the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) corporate tax residence is determined based on
the place of incorporation . . . .”).
43. Eric J. Allen & Susan Morse, Tax-Haven Incorporation for U.S.-Headquartered Firms: No
Exodus Yet, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 395, 395–96 (2013); Daniel Shaviro, The Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S.
Corporate Residence, 64 TAX L. REV. 377, 378 (2011).
44. Daniel J. Hemel, The President’s Power to Tax, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 633, 662–64 (2017).
45. Cathy Hwang, The New Corporate Migration: Tax Diversion Through Inversion, 80
BROOK. L. REV. 807, 827 (2015) (citing Cooper Indus., Ltd., Registration Statement (Form S-4), at
13–14 (June 11, 2001)).
46. This includes the usual suspects, including the Cayman Islands, the Isle of Man, Jersey,
Vanuatu, Bermuda, and the British Virgin Islands. See PALAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 30–33.
47. Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 246 (2010).
48. Gregory Day, Irrational Investors and the Corporate Inversion Puzzle, 69 SMU L. REV.
453, 454 (2016).
49. See Eric L. Talley, Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory Competition,
101 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1651 (2015) (“analyz[ing] the current inversion wave (and reactions to it)
from both practical and theoretical perspectives”).
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the Cayman Islands together accounted for a staggering forty percent
of U.S.-based companies legally migrating to foreign jurisdictions.50 The
figure jumps to sixty-four percent when adding four additional wellknown tax havens to the mix—Antigua, the British Virgin Islands, the
Marshall Islands, and Ireland.51 While various legislative and
regulatory actions have reacted to the alarming rates of what one
commentator has described as “the new corporate migration,”52 it is too
early to determine whether these efforts will accomplish their intended
goals.53
B. Offshore “Headquarters”
While incorporating in an offshore tax haven remains the
primary method employed in tax planning strategies, business entities
in certain financial sectors have set up their headquarters in offshore
jurisdictions too. This may surprise anyone who studies the
demographics of some of the most successful offshore financial havens.
For instance, the Cayman Islands, with a total land mass about 1.5
times the size of Washington, D.C., and a permanent population of
58,441 people,54 is said to house thousands of investment funds.55
But perhaps the problem is our overly myopic intuition that
corporate activities ought to have extensive territorial contact with a
particular jurisdiction. Financial instruments that constitute the bread

50. Id. at 1748–51 app. B.
51. Id.
52. Hwang, supra note 45, at 807.
53. Compare Trump to Keep Obama Rule Curbing Corporate Tax Inversion Deals, REUTERS
(Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tax-inversions/trump-to-keep-obama-rulecurbing-corporate-tax-inversion-deals-idUSKBN1C92RQ
[https://perma.cc/KCR5-HZPV]
(“A
2011-2015 wave of inversion deals prompted Treasury to take a series of actions that culminated
in an April 2016 rule release and the collapse of a $160-billion deal between U.S. drugmaker Pfizer
Inc (PFE.N) and Ireland’s Allergan Plc (AGN.N), which would have been the largest inversion
ever.”), with Richard Waters, Tax Havens Retain Allure for US Tech, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/bcf50bfc-ffd4-11e7-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5 [https://perma.cc/2U8U-7JDQ]
(“The US tax overhaul will not prompt the country’s big tech companies to drop their reliance on
overseas tax avoidance strategies or create more jobs at home, according to tax experts.”); see also
Day, supra note 48, at 461–65 (describing recent regulatory measures aimed to prevent U.S.
corporations from migrating to foreign jurisdictions for tax purposes).
54. The
World
Factbook:
Cayman
Islands,
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cj.html (last updated Sept. 26,
2018) [https://perma.cc/74HV-PXKS].
55. DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, FREE LUNCH: HOW THE WEALTHIEST AMERICANS ENRICH
THEMSELVES AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE 253 (2007) (“Hedge funds are legally organized offshore,
the favorite spot being the Cayman Islands. . . . Most hedge-fund managers have never even been
to the Cayman Islands, making the headquarters arrangement a farce.”); see also infra note 280
(reporting a total of 11,061 funds registered in the Cayman Islands as of June 2015).
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and butter of the financial sector are in essence contracts that rely on
legal systems to enforce rights.56 Unlike industries that rely on
productive activities tied to an identifiable parcel of territory (think, for
instance, automobile manufacturing in Detroit), financial transactions
are legally constituted.57 Because finance is built and constituted by
systems of rules, the industry need not be territorial at all.58 This is
particularly true for entities like hedge funds or mutual funds that do
not serve direct customers.59
It is for this reason that firms in several important sectors of
finance have been able to structure their operations to locate “the head
office in an offshore center with the onshore activities organized into
affiliates of the offshore headquarters.”60 Although examples abound,
this Section will focus on two salient contemporary illustrations of how
commercial entities can be headquartered in offshore jurisdictions
without (for the most part) physically moving their operations offshore:
hedge funds in the Cayman Islands and insurance companies in
Bermuda.
1. Hedge Funds in the Cayman Islands
Hedge funds are investment funds that pool capital from
individual and institutional investors aiming to make a positive market
return through investing in securities and other assets.61 To
understand how the Cayman Islands, with a tiny permanent workforce,
became the world’s largest host of hedge funds,62 one needs to
56. Katrina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 315, 315 (2013) (“Financial
assets are contracts the value of which depends in large part on their legal vindication . . . .”).
57. Id. at 316–18.
58. William J. Moon, Tax Havens as Producers of Corporate Law, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1081,
1089–90 (2018) [hereinafter Moon, Tax Havens] (reviewing BRUNER, supra note 3). This is because
finance is “legally constructed” in the sense that financial assets are simply “contracts the value
of which depends in large part on their legal vindication.” Pistor, supra note 56, at 315.
59. Edward D. Kleinbard, Competitive Convergence in the Financial Services Markets, 81
TAXES 225, 230–31 (2003).
60. PHILIP R. LANE & GIAN MARIA MILESI-FERRETTI, CROSS-BORDER INVESTMENT IN SMALL
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTERS 5–6 (2010). As Professor William Magnuson explains, the
unprecedented mobility of capital has allowed “companies to operate on a global basis from
headquarters in the Cayman Islands or the Seychelles, countries recognized as tax havens.”
William Magnuson, Unilateral Corporate Regulation, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 521, 537 (2016).
61. William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1382–83
(2007) (“Some specialize in securities of distressed firms, while others make directional bets on the
movement of currency exchange or interest rates. Still others pursue convertible arbitrage, going
long in a convertible bond and shorting the underlying common stock.”); John Morley, The
Regulation of Mutual Fund Debt, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 343, 347–48 (2013).
62. Houman B. Shadab, Hedge Fund Governance, 19 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 141, 155 (2013).
Some estimate that “around [eighty-five] percent of the world’s hedge funds are domiciled in the

Moon_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

14

1/31/2019 8:01 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1:1

understand the basic legal structure of hedge funds. A hedge fund
typically consists of three basic entities: “the fund itself, the fund’s
management company, and the fund’s equity investors.”63 In a typical
offshore design, the fund’s management company is composed of
investment professionals who operate “onshore,” while the hedge fund
itself is in one of the offshore financial havens.64
Managers based in the United States typically set up standalone business entities called “feeder funds” in offshore jurisdictions
principally to cater to two clients: tax-exempt U.S. entities (like
university endowments and pension funds) and foreign investors.65
Feeder funds are important because they help funds avoid triggering
U.S. tax liability for both U.S. tax-exempt entities and foreign
investors.66 As an added benefit, Cayman Islands law enables investors
to set up opaque financial structures that provide a degree of anonymity
from U.S. regulators.67 These are among the key incentives for offshore
funds to keep the appearance of foreign territorial operations.68 As a
Cayman Islands.” The Cayman Islands: A Guide for Hedge Fund Managers, MOURANT OZANNES 1
(2017), https://www.mourant.com/file-library/media—-2017/2017-guides/the-cayman-islands—-aguide-for-hedge-fund-managers.pdf [https://perma.cc/CSR2-98MB].
63. Shadab, supra note 62, at 150.
64. See, e.g., SEC v. Gruss, 859 F. Supp. 2d 653, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (describing a typical
offshore fund structure, where the fund was “incorporated, administered, registered, domiciled
and regulated in the Cayman Islands” whereas “the actual ‘operational and investment decisions
for the Offshore Fund were all made by the Offshore Fund’s manager, DBZCO, primarily in
DBZCO’s New York office’ ” (quoting Complaint ¶ 20, Gruss, 859 F. Supp. 2d 653)).
65. Summer A. Lepree, Taxation of United States Tax-Exempt Entities’ Offshore Hedge Fund
Investments: Application of the Section 514 Debt-Financed Rules to Leveraged Hedge Funds and
Derivatives and the Case for Equalization, 61 TAX LAW. 807, 815 (2008).
66. See DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS 361 (2005)
(discussing the U.S. tax considerations for offshore hedge funds). U.S. tax-exempt entities, for
instance, may face domestic tax liability on “unrelated business taxable income,” commonly
referred to as “UBTI.” Offshore feeder funds, also known as blocker corporations, help avoid
triggering this tax liability. See Offshore Hedge Funds vs. Onshore Hedge Funds, FUND ASSOCIATES
4
(2008),
http://fundassociates.com/pdfs/Offshore_vs_Onshore_Funds_Whitepaper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5SEQ-LNSQ]. Similarly, while a foreign investor may possibly trigger tax
liability by being considered to be engaged in a U.S. business, investing through an offshore feeder
fund “blocks” this potential exposure at the offshore level. See A Practical Guide to U.S. Tax
Compliance Issues for Hedge Fund of Funds, PEPPER HAMILTON, LLP 4 (2008),
http://www.pepperlaw.com/uploads/files/fundoffunds_schneidman_1008.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
5FZM-CC5N].
67. Fichtner, supra note 4, at 1037.
68. See Michael Brocard & François-Serge Lhabitant, A Primer on the Tax Framework of
Offshore and Onshore Hedge Funds, EDHEC BUS. SCH. 23 (2016), https://www.edhec.edu/
sites/www.edhec-portail.pprod.net/files/publications/pdf/edhec-working-paper-a-primer-on-thetax-framework-f_1467203960443-pdfjpg [https://perma.cc/E87T-EJSJ] (discussing hedge funds’
complex legal and operational structures that lend themselves to complicated tax structures,
particularly in the Cayman Islands). The offshore structure allows the hedge fund to accomplish
tax benefits as well. As a widely cited New York Times piece explained in 2007, Cayman Islands
tax laws help “American fund managers legally defer domestic taxes on their personal profits by
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hedge fund consultant based in the Cayman Islands explained in a
Forbes spread, “In order to ensure that your fund is not seen as being
run within the U.S., it’s common practice to have a majority of non-U.S.
directors on the board of the fund itself.”69 Indeed, several offshore
jurisdictions legally require foreign-based funds to establish some form
of contact with the jurisdiction, including retaining local directors who
play little or no role in the management of the funds.70
Absent this legal structure, offshore funds are run by U.S.-based
managers no differently than typical onshore funds. As Professor
Houman Shadab explains, “[M]anagement companies enjoy the same
general plenary powers over offshore funds’ investments and other
operations as they do with onshore funds.”71
2. Insurance Companies in Bermuda
Bermuda, a tiny island in the Atlantic Ocean familiar to
Americans as a tourist destination, is now the “third largest insurance
market in the world.”72 The island boasts its status as the largest
supplier of both “reinsurance business” (essentially insurance for
insurers) as well as the “captive insurance market” (a sophisticated
form of self-insurance of a parent company through a subsidiary
insurer).73
To understand how Bermuda became a magnet for insurance
companies—particularly the ones that focus on providing coverage to
U.S.-based risks—one must first understand the structure of the
insurance industry. Unlike territory-reliant industries, parts of the
insurance industry do not require “significant fixed assets and

channeling them offshore through their funds.” Lynnley Browning, Offshore Tax Breaks Lure
Money Managers, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/01/business/
yourmoney/01cay.html [https://perma.cc/4266-2KA7].
69. Ky Trang Ho, Why Hedge Funds Love to Go Offshore, FORBES (May 9, 2015),
https://web.archive.org/web/20150516100546/http://www.forbes.com:80/sites/trangho/2015/05/09/
why-hedge-funds-love-to-go-offshore/3 [https://perma.cc/AS3H-8XT2]; see also Shadab, supra
note62, at 156 (“From a governance point of view, the most distinguishing aspect of offshore hedge
funds is that, unlike most of their U.S.-based peers, offshore hedge funds typically have a board of
directors . . . . In practice, the oversight role hedge fund directors play is likely not substantial.”).
70. See John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund
Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1253 (2014) [hereinafter Morley, Investment Fund]
(explaining the pattern of separating funds and managers for the purpose of limiting fund
investors’ control rights to obtain greater profits).
71. Shadab, supra note 62, at 155.
72. CHRISTOPHER BICKLEY, BERMUDA, BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS AND CAYMAN ISLANDS
COMPANY LAW 3 (2013).
73. BRUNER, supra note 3, at 59.
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enormous workforce.”74 As explained by Professor Edward Kleinbard,
“[A] reinsurer can in fact have a commercial presence in the primary
insurer’s jurisdiction through the retention of an agent of independent
status, thereby facilitating its reinsurance business in respect of risks
in that jurisdiction.”75
Through this process, U.S. insurance companies owned by
Bermuda parent companies reduce the tax burden on their insurance
activities without bringing the foreign parent companies into the U.S.
net income tax system.76 Thus, the parent entities can “minimize
taxation on passive portfolio income such as interest and dividends, in
part because of the low or zero tax-haven rate.”77 The result is the
ability to provide coverage to U.S.-based risks operating in the United
States while maintaining minimal physical presence in Bermuda.
C. The Prevailing Scholarly Account
Until fairly recently, the study of offshore financial havens in
legal scholarship was almost completely monopolized by tax scholars.78
The important body of work by these scholars demonstrates the vast
impact that offshore jurisdictions can have in the global economy,
ultimately affecting domestic policy. In a seminal work, for instance,
Professor Reuven S. Avi-Yonah documented how tax havens allow
“large amounts of capital to go untaxed, depriving both developed and
developing countries of revenue and forcing them to rely on forms of
taxation less progressive than the income tax.”79 Against this backdrop,
Avi-Yonah proposed the “coordinated imposition of withholding taxes
on international portfolio investment,”80 as well as the taxing of
multinational corporations “initially in the jurisdictions where their
goods and services are consumed.”81 Recent works continue the

74. Kleinbard, supra note 59, at 235.
75. Id. at 236.
76. Id.
77. Allen & Morse, supra note 43, at 412.
78. For one of the earliest accounts, see Walter W. Bruno, Tax Considerations in Selecting a
Form of Foreign Business Organization, 13 VAND. L. REV. 151 (1959). Outside of legal scholarship,
offshore jurisdictions have long been studied both by economists and political scientists. See
RONEN PALAN, THE OFFSHORE WORLD: SOVEREIGN MARKETS, VIRTUAL PLACES, AND NOMAD
MILLIONAIRES 8–9 (2003) (reviewing existing accounts).
79. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare
State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1575 (2000).
80. Id. at 1579.
81. Id. at 1575.
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tradition of investigating unilateral and multilateral solutions to
reduce tax evasion or avoidance.82
Within the past two decades, legal scholars have increasingly
turned attention to the interrelationship between corporate law and tax
law. According to Professors Mitchell Kane and Ed Rock, while offshore
incorporation is “unabashedly all about tax reduction,”83 it also
concerns corporate law because it requires corporate entities to opt into
“a different, possibly inferior, corporate law regime.”84 This view is now
fairly well accepted. As Professor Victor Fleischer observes, “In some
circumstances, managers will opt to minimize taxes by choosing a tax
haven or tax-friendly jurisdiction, even if that jurisdiction is suboptimal
from the standpoint of corporate law.”85
Others are more optimistic about the virtues of offshore financial
havens, relying on the corporate charter competition experience in the
United States. In the United States, corporate law—the body of law
governing relations between firm managers and shareholders—is
largely a matter of state law.86 Corporate entities can choose to be
governed by a particular state’s laws simply by electing to incorporate
in that state.87 Privately selected corporate governance rules are said to
be welfare enhancing and encourage jurisdictional competition between

82. See, e.g., Andrew Blair-Stanek, Intellectual Property Law Solutions to Tax Avoidance, 62
UCLA L. REV. 2, 4 (2015) (proposing a change in intellectual property law rather than tax law to
combat tax avoidance); Samuel D. Brunson, Repatriating Tax-Exempt Investments: Tax Havens,
Blocker Corporations, and Unrelated Debt-Financed Income, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 225, 229 (2012)
(discussing a proposal to repeal the unrelated debt-financed income regime and instead police taxexempt entities through reportable transaction rules); Mark P. Gergen, How to Tax Capital, 70
TAX L. REV. 1, 4–6 (2016) (suggesting a securities tax to reduce incentives for tax avoidance and
evasion); Tracy A. Kaye, Innovations in the War on Tax Evasion, 2014 BYU L. REV. 363, 365
(offering global transparency and a multilateral information exchange platform as solutions for
international offshore tax evasion).
83. Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and International Charter
Competition, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1230 (2008).
84. Id.; see also Orsolya Kun, Corporate Inversions: The Interplay of Tax, Corporate, and
Economic Implications, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 313, 314 (2004) (“The conversion of a U.S.-based
multinational into a foreign corporation not only alters the tax exposure of the corporate group,
but also changes the laws that govern intra-corporate relations.”).
85. Fleischer, supra note 47, at 276.
86. Tung, supra note 28, at 3335.
87. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (holding that a state does not have an
interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations and therefore can only regulate
corporations incorporated within it). Historically, this was not the case. Prior to the late nineteenth
century, corporate activities were primarily local, and corporate law was largely monopolized by
the state where the corporation conducted its business. Capital mobility and the growth of
interstate business effectively broke this monopoly, for “[l]egislatures could not afford to . . . driv[e]
business out of state to the detriment of local interests.” Tung, supra note 28, at 46.
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states, resulting in innovative corporate governance rules.88 This
competition is enabled by private entities’ ability to choose the
corporate law of any state without establishing territorial presence in
the chosen state.89
Scholars have extended this framework to the international
jurisdictional competition context in areas tertiary to corporate law.
Offshore financial havens purportedly provide an array of
differentiated regulatory rules unavailable in the United States.90 This
typically includes the absence of accounting rules and disclosure rules—
along with other “regulatory-compliance” costs—that an entity would
be subjected to when operating in a purely domestic context.91 Professor
Jonathan Macey and attorney Anna Manasco Dionne, for instance,
argue that competition introduced by offshore jurisdictions leads to
financial and regulatory innovation.92 Some proponents of
interjurisdictional competition readily acknowledge the dark sides of
offshore jurisdictions that manifest in the form of money laundering,
financial fraud, terrorism financing, and tax evasion.93 But they counsel

88. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1–5 (1993). But see Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1437 (1992) (arguing that “the presence of managerial
opportunism and externalities may lead states to adopt undesirable corporate law rules”).
89. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 225, 225–27 (1985) (evaluating, from an empirical perspective, the relation between
corporate migration patterns and the rationale for reincorporating and testing the level of states’
responsiveness to private-sector preferences). Delaware is widely regarded as the winner of this
competition. The advantages of Delaware corporate law are well known. In addition to the state
legislature enacting cutting-edge corporate law, the Delaware Court of Chancery, staffed with
renowned business law jurists, is famous for producing a refined body of corporate law that reduces
uncertainty, ultimately benefiting both managers and shareholders. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The
Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV.
1061, 1064 (2000) (attributing Delaware’s success in attracting corporate charters to “the unique
lawmaking function of the Delaware courts”); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977); Lewis S. Black, Jr.,
Why Corporations Choose Delaware, DEL. DEP’T STATE 1–7 (2007), https://corpfiles.delaware.gov/
whycorporations_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/NT2L-95WU].
90. See BRUNER, supra note 3, at 10–11.
91. Marco Becht, Colin Mayer & Hannes F. Wagner, Where Do Firms Incorporate?
Deregulation and the Cost of Entry, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 241, 242 (2008); see also Magnuson, supra
note 60, at 527 n.17 (“There is strong evidence that corporations choose their country of
incorporation based on regulatory costs, including minimum capital requirements and setup
costs.”).
92. Jonathan Macey & Anna Manasco Dionne, Offshore Finance and Onshore Markets:
Racing to the Bottom, or Moving Toward Efficient?, in OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS AND
REGULATORY COMPETITION 8–10 (Andrew P. Morriss ed., 2010).
93. Andrew P. Morriss, Introduction to OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS AND REGULATORY
COMPETITION, supra note 92, at 7.
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against “the welfare-enhancing baby from being thrown out with the
money-laundering bathwater.”94
While insightful in many regards, these discussions are largely
limited to the relative merits of firms opting out of “internal” corporate
governance rules, along with regulatory compliance requirements.95
Largely overlooked are the collateral consequences that can be
attributable to transnational corporate structuring on the back-end
litigation side. Offshore corporate migration, as I show in the next Part,
impacts the applicability of important federal regulatory statutes.
II. OFFSHORE FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS AND THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
REACH OF FEDERAL STATUTES
This Part uncovers how offshore corporate form can render
predominantly “domestic” transactions outside the reach of federal
regulatory statutes. It is worth noting up front that Congress typically
enacts statutes that are “geoambiguous,”96 giving only “cryptic clues as
to their territorial scope.”97 It is for this reason that courts are often
called upon to constructively assess the spatial reach of federal statutes,
employing a canon of statutory construction known as the presumption

94. Id.
95. Fleischer, supra note 47, at 230 (defining regulatory arbitrage as “the manipulation of
the structure of a deal to take advantage of a gap between the economic substance of a transaction
and its regulatory treatment”). The “regulatory arbitrage” literature, for instance, identifies the
sorts of regulatory gamesmanship that involve legal planning techniques used to avoid taxes and
other regulatory costs. Id. at 229. In a seminal work, Professor Ronald Gilson identified the
important ways that private entities make decisions that take into consideration both regulatory
costs and ordinary Coasian transactional costs. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business
Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 255 (1984). In a more recent work,
Victor Fleischer identified how regulatory arbitrage arises when private entities identify “gaps
between legal form and economic substance.” Fleischer, supra note 47, at 239. While some scholars
have recognized the arbitrage opportunities that arise when multiple sovereigns are at play, the
discussion is generally limited to costs internalized by corporate entities in the form of taxes and
regulatory compliance costs. Id. at 246:
The ability to choose one’s planning of incorporation provides planning opportunities in
the international context as well, of course. U.S. companies sometimes consider reincorporating in a tax-haven jurisdiction. Incorporating abroad allows multinationals
to pay U.S. tax only on U.S.-source income and offer other opportunities to shelter U.S.
income through transfer pricing, income stripping, and other techniques.
(footnotes omitted).
96. Judge Jeffrey Meyer uses this term to describe federal statutes that “proscribe or regulate
conduct but that remain silent about whether they apply to acts that occur outside of the United
States.” Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110, 114 (2010).
97. Russell J. Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and Securities Laws:
An Inquiry into the Utility of A “Choice-of-Law” Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 1800 (1992).
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against extraterritoriality.98 While this canon traces its roots to the
early nineteenth century,99 the Supreme Court substantially rewrote
the canon recently through a series of blockbuster decisions. Labeled as
“rigidly territorialist” by Professor Carlos Vázquez,100 the Court’s recent
jurisprudence is described by Professor Hannah Buxbaum as a
“continuing quest to identify categorical, territory-based rules” to
govern “messy and often unpredictable patterns of transnational
economic activity.”101 Section A provides an up-to-date primer on the
Supreme Court’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence. Section B illustrates
how this line of jurisprudence has produced rulings in the lower courts
delimiting federal statutes from applying to cases involving offshore
commercial entities that are substantially connected to the United
States.
A. Extraterritoriality in the Post-Morrison World
The Supreme Court’s recent reshaping of its federal
extraterritoriality jurisprudence started in 2010 with Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd., involving three Australian investors who
bought stock in Australia’s largest bank listed on the Australian
Securities Exchange.102 The investors filed a suit in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York under the antifraud
provision of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934(“Exchange Act”),
alleging that the bank manipulated the financial models of a U.S.
mortgage-service company it purchased to make its business appear
more valuable.103 The critical issue was whether Congress intended the
Exchange Act to cover this sort of action by a company whose stock was
traded on foreign exchanges.104

98. See Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment
Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1228–33 (1992). As the Morrison Court reminds us, the
presumption is a “canon of construction . . . rather than a limit upon Congress’s power to legislate.”
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
99. See William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 85 (1998) (noting the Supreme Court’s early use of the presumption to
limit the reach of federal customs and piracy laws).
100. Vázquez, supra note 10, at 68.
101. Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Scope and Limitations of the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 62, 62 (2016).
102. 561 U.S. at 249. One might argue that it started earlier, when Justice Scalia penned a
scathing dissent in the seminal case of Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California concerning the
extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act. See 509 U.S. 764, 800 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The
dissent arguably set the intellectual groundwork for Morrison. See id. at 800–02.
103. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 249–50.
104. Id. at 247–49.
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Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, held that civil
actions for securities fraud under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
cannot be based on a sale that took place on a foreign exchange. This
conclusion was based on the Court’s observation that there is “no
affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that §10(b) applies
extraterritorially,”105 coupled with the finding that the focus of the
Exchange Act “is not upon the place where the deception originated, but
upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States.”106
While the outcome of the case was relatively unremarkable,107
Morrison is remarkable for rewriting the presumption against
extraterritoriality canon into a two-step test.108 Under this test, a court
must first ask “whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication
that it applies extraterritorially.”109 If the statute does not, the court
must then determine whether the case involves a permissible “domestic
application of the statute by looking to the statute’s ‘focus.’ ”110 Under
the second step, “if the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a
foreign country, then the case involves an impermissible
extraterritorial application regardless of any other conduct that
occurred in U.S. territory.”111 Employing this test, the Morrison Court
concluded that the Exchange Act did not apply to the facts at hand
because it applies only to “transactions in securities listed on domestic
exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities.”112
Since Morrison, the Supreme Court has invoked the
presumption at a rapid pace by historical standards.113 In Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum, decided in 2013, the Court invoked the
105. Id. at 265.
106. Id. at 266.
107. The case involved the fairly controversial topic of applying U.S. securities law to the socalled “f-cubed” transactions, where foreign shareholders purchase stock of a foreign issuer on a
foreign exchange. The Court was merely affirming the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit’s holding, albeit overturning the lower court’s long-standing doctrinal test. For an excellent
discussion on “f-cubed” securities litigation, see Elizabeth Cosenza, Paradise Lost: § 10(b) after
Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 343, 344–45 (2010).
108. For a general critique of how the Morrison Court reshaped the presumption against
extraterritoriality, see Lea Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia
Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of
American Law, 40 SW. L. REV. 655 (2011) [hereinafter Brilmayer, New Extraterritoriality].
109. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 248.
110. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016) (quoting Morrison,
561 U.S. at 249).
111. Id.
112. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 249.
113. Maggie Gardner, RJR Nabisco and the Runaway Canon, 102 VA. L. REV. 134, 136 (“[T]he
presumption against extraterritoriality fell into disuse after the 1940s. The Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations Law, published in 1987, did not even bother to include it.” (footnotes omitted)).
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presumption to hold that alleged human rights violations committed by
the Royal Dutch Shell Company in the Ogoni region of Nigeria could
not be brought under the Alien Tort Statute because “all the relevant
conduct” regarding those violations “took place outside the United
States.”114 In its most recent opinion on the topic, RJR Nabisco, Inc. v.
European Community, the Court extended the presumption to a suit
involving U.S. corporations that allegedly directed a racketeering
activity from the United States to launder drug-trafficking money
through cigarette purchases, resulting in harm to European stateowned cigarette businesses.115 The Court declined to apply the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act to the facts of the
case, reasoning that private litigants bringing a RICO claim must
establish “domestic injury” and not “domestic conduct.”116
The Supreme Court’s new extraterritoriality jurisprudence has
dramatically impacted plaintiffs attempting to bring private suits with
a transnational fact pattern.117 Importantly, the first step virtually
prohibits a federal judge from finding congressional intent to apply
statutes outside of the U.S. territory absent express instructions—
something that rarely exists in the world of federal statutes.118 While
the second step leaves the door open, an attempt to decipher the “focus”
of a particular statute frequently serves as a screening mechanism
eliminating the type of connecting factors that could overcome the
114. 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013). For an introduction to the scope of the Alien Tort Statute, see
William J. Moon, The Original Meaning of the Law of Nations, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. 51, 57–61 (2016).
115. 136 S. Ct. at 2098. Importantly, the Supreme Court held that the provision conferring the
plaintiff’s right of action could not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, while
holding that the substantive provision of RICO applied extraterritorially. Carlos M. Vázquez &
Ingrid Wuerth, Introduction to Agora: Reflections on RJR Nabisco v. European Community, 110
AJIL UNBOUND 37, 37 (2016).
116. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2111.
117. See Bookman, supra note 10, at 1097–99 (discussing the cases that comprise the Court’s
extraterritoriality jurisprudence); Patrick J. Borchers, How “International” Should A Third
Conflicts Restatement Be in Tort and Contract?, 27 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 461, 461 (2017)
(describing the Exchange Act and RICO as being construed by the Supreme Court “in implausibly
narrow fashions to limit their impact abroad”); Katherine Florey, State Law, U.S. Power, Foreign
Disputes: Understanding the Extraterritorial Effects of State Law in the Wake of Morrison v.
National Australia Bank, 92 B.U. L. REV. 535, 542 (2012) (describing the Morrison opinion as
adhering to an old-fashioned and formalistic view of territory).
118. Brilmayer, New Extraterritoriality, supra note 108, at 655 (assessing that the first step
instructs “lower courts to turn a deaf ear to indications of congressional intent any subtler than
the proverbial meat axe”). This much is clear from the Supreme Court’s blunt admission in Nabisco
that the new extraterritoriality test does not actually concern what Congress would want but
whether Congress explicitly gave indication on a statute’s geographic scope. See RJR Nabisco, 136
S. Ct. at 2100 (“The question is not whether we think ‘Congress would have wanted’ a statute to
apply to foreign conduct ‘if it had thought of the situation before the court,’ but whether Congress
has affirmatively and unmistakably instructed that the statute will do so.” (quoting Morrison v.
Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010))).
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presumption against extraterritoriality. Thus, for instance, in Nabisco,
the overwhelming facts connecting the case to the United States—“[a]ll
defendants are U.S. corporations, headquartered in the United States,
charged with a pattern of racketeering activity directed and managed
from the United States, involving conduct occurring in the United
States”119—were insufficient to trigger the RICO statute because the
“focus” of the statute was determined by the majority of the Justices to
be the regulation of “domestic injury” and not “domestic conduct.”120
And in Morrison, even though the relevant fraudulent conduct took
place in the United States, this was insufficient because congressional
focus was not to punish deceptive conduct alone but “deceptive conduct
‘in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered.’ ”121
Below, I illustrate the impact of this line of jurisprudence on the
offshore context by examining recent cases involving the
extraterritorial application of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the RICO Act,
and the Exchange Act.
B. Offshore Application
1. “Domestic” Fraudulent Transfers Under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff
Investment Securities LLC is one of the dozens of high-stakes
bankruptcy litigations stemming from the infamous Madoff Ponzi
scheme.122 Madoff, a former chairman of the NASDAQ, pleaded guilty
to eleven counts of federal crimes in 2009 after running a $50 billion
Ponzi scheme through his fund, Bernard L. Madoff Investment
Securities (“BLMIS”).123 Madoff did not actually engage in any
securities transactions on behalf of his customers, but “sent them bogus
customer statements and trade confirmations showing fictitious
trading activity and profits.”124 Investors in this scheme included both

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

136 S. Ct. at 2114 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2111 (majority opinion).
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012)).
513 B.R. 222, 225 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014).
Amir Efrati, Tom Lauricella & Dionne Searcey, Top Broker Accused of $50 Billion Fraud,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2008), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122903010173099377
[https://perma.cc/7HTW-9X4F]; Robert Frank, Amir Efrati, Aaron Lucchetti & Chad Bray, Madoff
Jailed After Admitting Epic Scam, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 13, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB123685693449906551 [https://perma.cc/Y9Y3-BFB9].
124. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, No. AP 08-01789 (SMB), 2016
WL 6900689, at *2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2016).
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domestic and foreign investors that invested in Madoff’s fund through
feeder funds formed in the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman
Islands.125 Prior to the collapse of Madoff’s fund, the feeder funds
withdrew proceeds from BLMIS’s commingled bank account that
included other customers’ investments along with “fake” profits and
distributed them to “their customers, managers, and the like.”126
Following the commencement of BLMIS’s liquidation, the courtappointed trustee sued the feeder funds, as well as the investors who
invested in BLMIS through the feeder funds, in order to recover the
transferred funds.
The relevant laws here are fraudulent transfer laws,127 codified
in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.128 The Code allows the trustee to
recover—or to use the statute’s term, “avoid”—fraudulent transfers in
order to spread the loss among defrauded creditors. In a typical
bankruptcy proceeding, a trustee is appointed to oversee a fair
distribution in accordance with the priority rules.129 The defendants in
Security Investor Protection Corp., who were recipients of the proceeds
from the feeder funds, moved to dismiss, arguing that the Bankruptcy
Code “does not apply extraterritorially and therefore does not reach
subsequent transfers made abroad by one foreign entity to another.”130
In
determining
whether
the
transfer
occurred
“extraterritorially,” Judge Jed Rakoff, applying Morrison, assessed that
125. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 513 B.R. at 225.
126. Id.
127. Fraudulent transfer laws trace their origin to legislation passed in 1571 in England
making “illegal and void any transfer made for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or defrauding
creditors.” Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper
Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 829 (1985). This statute, commonly known as the Statute of 13
Elizabeth, was designed to curb what was thought to be a widespread practice of debtors avoiding
creditors through entering and living in sanctuaries unreachable by the King’s writ—including the
interior of a church and certain precincts defined by custom or royal grant. Id.
128. Section 548(a)(1) permits avoidance of fraudulent transfers that were executed “with
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after
the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(1)(a) (2012). Section 550(a) permits the trustee to recover the transfer avoided under
Section 548. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (2012).
129. The particular case at hand involved the trustee proceeding pursuant to the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (“SIPA”). See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(b) (2012). SIPA “merely engrafts
special features onto the familiar framework of a liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code . . . to address the concerns peculiar to the orderly liquidation of a brokerage.”
Picard v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 762 F.3d 199, 212 (2d Cir. 2014). An ordinary clawback action
involving a Ponzi scheme is not particularly difficult given that transfers in connection with a
Ponzi scheme are presumed to be fraudulent transfers. See, e.g., Drenis v. Haligiannis, 452 F.
Supp. 2d 418, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[T]he defrauding defendants [were] alleged elsewhere in the
complaint to be perpetrators of a Ponzi scheme. In such cases, courts have found that the debtor’s
intent to hinder, delay or defraud is presumed to be established.”).
130. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 513 B.R. at 226.
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the “focus” of the relevant sections of the Bankruptcy Code was on the
“property transferred [and] the fact of its transfer, not the debtor.”131
Under this analysis, the transfer at issue was extraterritorial and thus
outside the reach of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code because “the relevant
transfers and transferees are predominantly foreign: foreign feeder
funds transferring assets abroad to their foreign customers and other
foreign transferees.”132
Importantly, Judge Rakoff’s analysis elevates the domicile of the
feeder funds—essentially glorified paperwork133—as the central factual
input of the extraterritoriality analysis.134 This is apparent as the
court’s analysis necessarily downplays the importance of the fact that
“the chain of transfers originated with Madoff Securities in New
York.”135 Judge Rakoff’s “focus” also glances over the fact that many of
the feeder funds were controlled and operated from the funds’ related
entities located in the United States. For instance, one major feeder
fund, Fairfield Cayman, maintained its principal place of business in
New York, operated out of a parent entity’s New York headquarters,
and “never had employees or an office in the Cayman Islands.”136
The decision’s narrow (and peculiar) construction of the
Bankruptcy Code’s geographic reach is perhaps best illustrated in an
example provided by Professor Ed Morrison in his critique of the
decision: “If Madoff wires funds from his New York account to Londonbased investors, the Trustee can bring suit against those investors. But
if Madoff carries a briefcase full of cash to London and then hands the
131. Id. at 227.
132. Id. Rather than ruling on each claim before him, Judge Rakoff remanded the cases for
the bankruptcy judge to decide each of the trustee’s avoidance claims within the parameters he
set forth. Id. at 232.
133. See Moon, Tax Havens, supra note 58, at 1095 (“[L]egal formalities may permit a juridical
center of operations appear to be in a particular jurisdiction using little more than glorified
paperwork.”).
134. It is important to remember that feeder funds themselves exist principally as a tax
avoidance tool. Recall that foreign investors typically invest in U.S.-managed funds not directly,
but through feeder funds formed in offshore jurisdictions for tax purposes. See supra Section I.B.1.
Absent this corporate structure, a foreign creditor withdrawing from a domestic fund would likely
fall within the reach of U.S. bankruptcy law. See Edward R. Morrison, Extraterritorial Avoidance
Actions: Lessons from Madoff, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 268, 283 (2014) [hereinafter
Morrison, Extraterritorial Avoidance] (“The trustee’s (or debtor’s) authority to recover the
fraudulent transfer does not disappear because the initial transferee is located abroad.”). Arguably
these foreign customers would have a “good faith” defense on grounds that they could not expect
their funds to be invested in a U.S.-based entity. See id. at 282; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(c), 550(b)
(2012) (offering defenses to a transferee “that takes for value” and “in good faith”). But this is a
separate question from the geographical reach of U.S. bankruptcy law.
135. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 513 B.R. at 228.
136. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, No. AP 08-01789 (SMB), 2016
WL 6900689, at *31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2016).
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cash to his investors, the Trustee apparently cannot bring suit because
the cash handoff was a ‘purely foreign transfer.’ ”137
2. “Domestic” Racketeering Under the RICO Act
The impact of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Nabisco
has already made shockwaves of confusion in the lower courts
adjudicating civil RICO cases.138 The recent case of Absolute Activist
Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Devine illustrates how courts have imputed
the location of the injury—the “focus” of the RICO statute under
Nabisco—based on the domicile of corporate entities.139
In Devine, eight hedge funds—all formed under the laws of the
Cayman Islands—sued Susan Devine, a long-term resident of Naples,
Florida. Devine was a former wife of Florian Homm, a chief investment
officer and investment manager for mutual funds who allegedly caused
more than $200 million in losses by inflating the prices of virtually
worthless U.S. microcap companies.140 After learning that the scheme
was at risk of being publicly disclosed, Devine allegedly formed a
criminal enterprise with Homm to conceal and transfer proceeds from
the scheme. This elaborate scheme encompassed:
[A] strategic divorce; the creation of a network of entities in far-flung locales, including
known bank secrecy havens; the use of accounts for which the Homm children were the
nominal beneficiaries to shield assets; the fabrication of records; the use of aliases;
difficult-to-trace transactions in cash, gold, and fine art; and innumerable bank
transfers.141

While the complaint alleged that the money-laundering scheme
was “directed, controlled, and participated in” by Devine in Florida,142
the court dismissed the RICO claim, reasoning that any alleged
economic injuries were suffered by the plaintiffs in “the only location
where the plaintiffs were located—in the Cayman Islands.”143 The court
reached this decision because the “focus” of RICO, under the Supreme
137. Morrison, Extraterritorial Avoidance, supra note 134, at 270 (quoting Sec. Inv’r Prot.
Corp., 513 B.R. at 232).
138. This much was predicted by Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Nabisco. As the Nabisco
Court explains, the application of the rule that a civil RICO plaintiff “allege and prove a domestic
injury to business or property . . . will not always be self-evident, as disputes may arise as to
whether a particular alleged injury is ‘foreign’ or ‘domestic.’ ” RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty.,
136 S. Ct. 2090, 2111 (2016).
139. Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Devine, 233 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1326 (M.D.
Fla. 2017).
140. Complaint ¶¶ 1–2, 12, Devine, 233 F. Supp. 3d 1297 (No. 15-00328).
141. Id. ¶ 3.
142. Id.
143. Devine, 233 F. Supp. 3d at 1326.
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Court’s Nabisco decision, is the “geographic location of the injury to
plaintiffs, not the location of a defendant’s wrongful acts.”144
It is important to note here that the court’s analysis neglects to
consider the source of the funds: as alleged in the complaint, the fund
operated by Homm invested “on behalf of hundreds of investors in the
United States and around the world.”145 Moreover, plaintiffs had
alleged that Devine directed the scheme, transferring wrongfully
obtained proceeds “while residing in Naples, Florida.”146 Whether these
facts constitute a sufficient nexus to the United States and whether the
alleged actions amounted to a RICO violation are separate questions.
What stands out is the formalistic line drawn by the court based on the
domicile of the fund, turning a blind eye to the significant U.S.
connection to the case.
3. “Domestic” Securities Under the Exchange Act
In Morrison, the Supreme Court limited application of Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act to either (i) “the purchase or sale of a security
listed on an American stock exchange,” or (ii) “the purchase or sale of
any other security in the United States.”147 The Morrison Court
provided little guidance on what constitutes a domestic purchase or sale
for a security not listed on an exchange like the NASDAQ or the New
York Stock Exchange.148 Morrison simply held that the provision
applies to nonexchange-based transactions when “the purchase or sale
is made in the United States.”149
Cascade Fund, LLLP v. Absolute Capital Management
illustrates how the offshore fund structure aids those engaging in
securities transactions with fairly substantial connections to the United
States to opt out of U.S. securities law. In Cascade Fund, a Coloradobased company invested in Absolute Capital Management (“ACM”), a
fund organized and registered under the laws of the Cayman Islands.
ACM contended that Morrison precluded the application of Section
10(b) claims because “the funds are not traded on any domestic stock
exchange and because the transaction . . . occurred in the Cayman
Islands, not the United States.”150 Cascade alleged four facts to
144. Id.
145. Complaint, supra note 140, ¶ 9.
146. Id. ¶ 146.
147. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 273 (2010).
148. Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 2012).
149. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 269–70.
150. Cascade Fund, LLLP v. Absolute Capital Mgmt. Holdings Ltd., No. 08-CV-01381-MSKCBS, 2011 WL 1211511, at *5 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2011).
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establish that the transaction was plausibly domestic in nature: “(i) the
Offering Memoranda and other investment materials were
disseminated to Cascade in the United States; (ii) . . . ACM executives
traveled to the United States to solicit American investors; (iii) Cascade
made its decision to invest while in the United States; and (iv) the
money for the purchase was wired to a bank in New York.”151
The court dismissed the case at the motion to dismiss stage,
reading Morrison as making “clear that the test of §10(b)’s reach is not
dependent on the fact that domestic investors in foreign securities were
harmed by fraud.”152 Interestingly, the court focused on the language of
the Subscription Agreement (the contract at issue), which made it “clear
that simply sending money to New York was not sufficient to complete
the transaction.”153 Thus, the court assessed that the transaction could
not have occurred in the United States because “the transaction was
not completed until ACM finally accepted an application—presumably
in its Cayman Islands offices.”154
Cascade Fund is indicative of post-Morrison jurisprudence that
has elevated the domicile of corporate entities as an important factual
input for determining the extraterritorial reach of federal statutes.155
More specifically, courts often refuse to apply federal securities law to
transactions completed through offshore entities because they view
these transactions as taking place outside the territory of the United
States.156 This is a particularly ill-advised method for determining
151. Id. at *7.
152. Id. at *5.
153. Id. at *7.
154. Id.
155. Consider the case of In re Banco Santander Securities-Optimal Litigation, 732 F. Supp.
2d 1305, 1340–41 (S.D. Fla. 2010), brought by investors in Bahamian feeder funds that were
established to invest in Madoff’s assets in New York. Observing that “[t]he funds at issue in this
case are registered under the laws of the Bahamas,” the court dismissed the claim, reasoning that
applying U.S. securities fraud law to the case would amount to interfering “with foreign securities
regulation that Morrison sought to avoid.” Id. at 1317. In other cases, U.S. securities law claims
are dismissed because an offshore jurisdiction’s regulatory approval is the condition precedent of
a contract completed through an offshore commercial entity. For instance, in Adderley v. Dingman,
a U.S. citizen’s securities fraud claim against a Bahamian corporation was dismissed,
notwithstanding the fact that the CEO of the Bahamian corporation made a number of
misrepresentations over a series of lunch meetings in Manhattan. See No. 15 Civ. 9935, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 54610, at **6–9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2017). The court reasoned that approval of the
Bahamian regulator was needed to complete a transaction through a Bahamian corporation,
essentially removing the transaction from the reach of U.S. securities law. Id. at *26.
156. See, e.g., MVP Asset Mgmt. (USA) LLC v. Vestbirk, No. 2:10-CV-02483-GEB, 2013 WL
1726359, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2013) (dismissing a Section 10(b) claim because plaintiffs failed
to identify the location of defendants when the parties entered into the “valid, binding and
enforceable agreement”); In re Merkin, 817 F. Supp. 2d 346, 357 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (dismissing
a Section 10(b) claim against a Cayman Islands hedge fund because there was no allegation any
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whether U.S. securities laws ought to govern a particular transaction
because “[m]arkets are moving to a point where the ‘site’ of a trade is
happenstance,” such that there is little “connection between the place
of trade and the injury.”157 To the extent that securities laws are
designed in part to deter local injury, limiting the reach of these laws
based on the place of trade makes little sense where the place of injury
does not align with the place of trade.
*

*

*

To recap, offshore financial havens have become virtual spaces
where the juridical residence of corporate entities plays a significant
role in delimiting the application of federal statutes. Perhaps more
importantly, the “focus” test developed by the Morrison Court invites
endless permutations of loopholes that allow commercial entities to
avoid the application of federal regulatory statutes. In the securities
regulation context, the new jurisprudence allows private entities, with
essentially a well-drafted contract and incorporation paperwork, to opt
out of Section 10(b) even while soliciting U.S. investors within U.S.
territory.158 And consider the implications of Judge Rakoff’s Madoff
ruling. As Professor Ed Morrison explains, under the Madoff decision,
“[a] transfer can be immunized from recovery simply by interposing a
foreign-based transferee between the debtor and the ultimate foreign
beneficiary.”159 This is not mere academic speculation. As Judge Shira
Scheindlin forewarned in a pre-Morrison case: “[A] creditor—be it
foreign or domestic—who wished to characterize a transfer as
extraterritorial could simply arrange to have the transfer made
overseas, a result made all too easy in the age of the multinational
company and information superhighway.”160 The next Part takes a step

shares at issue were traded on a domestic exchange or purchased in a domestic transaction); Basis
Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 533, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(dismissing Section 10(b) claims related to transactions by a Cayman Islands entity when plaintiff
“fail[ed] to provide sufficient facts that allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the
purchase or sale was made in the United States”).
157. Comments by Forty-Two Law Professors, Comment Letter on Release No. 34-63174,
Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action, at 7 (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/
comments/4-617/4617-28.pdf [https://perma.cc/262V-T96C].
158. This should give some reason for concern. As Hannah Buxbaum explains, the
territorialist jurisprudence in the securities regulation context enables transactions that are “not
only manipulable but can be non-transparent to the other party.” Buxbaum, Remedies, supra note
12, at 173.
159. Morrison, Extraterritorial Avoidance, supra note 134, at 269–70.
160. In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp., 186 B.R. 807, 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d
Cir. 1996).
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back and interrogates the purported reasons that underlie this line of
jurisprudence.
III. CORPORATE DOMICILE AND TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY
This Part assesses whether the foreign status of offshore
commercial entities alone should convert otherwise domestic
transactions into “extraterritorial” transactions outside the reach of
federal statutes. Section A introduces readers to the traditional and
modern conceptions of territorial sovereignty that underlie the federal
extraterritoriality jurisprudence. Section B shows the implausibility of
a jurisdiction asserting an authority to regulate conduct based on
corporate domicile alone. While a good argument can be made that
federal and state judges ought to defer to foreign law when it comes to
corporate governance rules over the “internal affairs” of business
entities formed in foreign nations, foreign incorporation alone should
not cause an authority to regulate conduct arising out of or related to
that entity. Viewed in this light, the recent extraterritoriality
jurisprudence discussed in Part II represents domestic regulatory laws
ceding to privately curated juridical rules under the doctrinal
framework of judicial modesty and international comity. Section C
raises several important policy considerations challenging the wisdom
of jurisdictional competition and regulatory arbitrage facilitated by the
Supreme Court’s recent extraterritoriality jurisprudence. Section D
offers sensible doctrinal solutions to regulate modern financial
transactions that refuse to be captured in traditional notions of space
and time.
A. Territorial Sovereignty Under Domestic and International Law
The presumption against extraterritoriality is a method of
statutory interpretation deployed to accomplish two goals. This
includes, first, effectuating Congress’s general practice of legislating
with “domestic concerns in mind,”161 and second, avoiding
“international discord that can result when U.S. law is applied to
conduct in foreign countries.”162 While the U.S. Supreme Court
described this “international discord” rationale as the “most
notabl[e]”163 reason for employing the presumption in Nabisco, the
161. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) (quoting Smith v.
United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
162. Id.
163. Id.
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Court has not stayed consistent on this point. In Morrison, for instance,
the Court stated that the presumption applies “regardless of whether
there is a risk of conflict between the American statute and a foreign
law,”164 leading an early commentator to conclude that the
international comity rationale embodied in the presumption was
dead.165 This did not turn out to be the case, as Nabisco in 2016
reaffirmed the international discord rationale as central to the
presumption.166
Regardless of whether comity concerns are already folded into
the presumption, it is worth reviewing the theoretical building blocks
underlying any given nation state’s authority to legislate in the first
place. This is important, because where there is no possible foreign
sovereign interest attributable to a particular transnational case, the
rationale underlying the presumption (and the related concept of
comity) becomes moot, resulting in nonapplication of federal law in a
vast range of transnational cases where application would advance U.S.
interests without clashing with foreign law.167 Moreover, a case
substantially connected to the United States would presumably involve
“domestic concerns” that federal statutes are designed for.168 Below, I
review the concept of territorial sovereignty as it relates to a sovereign’s
authority to legislate and apply the principle to the case of offshore
financial transactions.
1. Traditional Conceptions of Territorial Sovereignty
Territorial sovereignty is a concept that traces its intellectual
origin to the historical legacy of the Westphalian sovereign state.169
Nation states, in the aftermath of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, were
principally defined by territorial borders under the premise that the

164. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
165. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Morrison’s Effects Test, 40 SW. L. REV. 687, 689 (2012)
[hereinafter Dodge, Effects Test] (“The first justification became difficult to maintain after the
Court applied the presumption in situations presenting no risk of conflict with foreign law, and
Morrison officially jettisoned it. Thus, the presumption now rests solely ‘on the perception that
Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign matters.’ ” (quoting Morrison,
561 U.S. at 255)).
166. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101.
167. Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 SUP.
CT. REV. 179, 215–17.
168. See, e.g., Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
169. Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2508 (2005) (“The
importance of place to legal rules and protections—the belief that law derives from land—has deep
historical roots. Defining law in spatial terms accords with the traditional conception of the
Westphalian sovereign state.”).
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world was divided into separate, equal, and independent states.170
Influenced by the work of seventeenth-century Dutch jurist Ulrich
Huber,171 Justice Joseph Story is credited with transplanting this
concept of territoriality to the U.S. legal discourse. In a celebrated
treatise, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, published in 1834,
Story explained that “every nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty
and jurisdiction within its own territory.”172
Because statehood was articulated in terms of a particular
parcel of territory, “jurisdiction, in the sense of a sovereign’s authority
over persons or events, was also referenced to their location within that
territory.”173 This historic legacy of the Westphalian state informed the
U.S. Supreme Court’s early extraterritoriality jurisprudence in federal
customs and piracy law disputes in the early nineteenth century.174 The
presumption against extraterritoriality made its modern appearance as
a canon of statutory interpretation in the early twentieth century.175 In
the seminal case of American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes famously noted that “all legislation is prima
facie territorial,” declining to extend the reach of the Sherman Act to
activities in Colombia.176
Strict territorialism was the principle that also influenced the
doctrinal development of a wide body of law at the time, including

170. It is for this reason that statehood is often conceptualized as an entity monopolizing the
use of legitimate authority in a particular territory. Territorial sovereignty, in both law and
political science, is generally understood as a nation exercising principal means of authority within
a given territory. See Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial
Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475, 476 (1998).
171. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV.
241, 259 (“Story borrowed from Huber the idea of the exclusivity of sovereign authority.”).
172. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18 (Edmund H. Bennett ed.,
Little, Brown & Co. 7th ed. 1872) (1834).
173. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Territory, Territoriality, and the Resolution of Jurisdictional
Conflict, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 631, 632 (2009) [hereinafter Buxbaum, Territoriality].
174. See, e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824); United States v. Palmer, 16
U.S. (3 Wheat) 610, 630–32 (1818).
175. See Dodge, Effects Test, supra note 165, at 687. Of course, the presumption against
extraterritoriality traces its doctrinal roots to the Charming Betsy canon, which teaches that
statutes should be construed not to violate international law. See David L. Sloss, Michael D.
Ramsey & William S. Dodge, International Law in the Supreme Court to 1860, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THE SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 7, 37–38 (David L. Sloss, Michael D.
Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011).
176. 213 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1909) (quoting Ex Parte Blain (1879) 12 Ch D 522 at 528 (Eng.)),
overruled as recognized in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400,
407–08 (1990). The opinion reflects strict territorialism that enjoyed its heyday around the time.
See id. at 356 (“[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”).
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judicial jurisdiction and conflict of laws.177 Judicial jurisdiction, or the
sovereign’s authority over persons or events, for instance, could be
determined by ascertaining the location of the persons or events within
that territory.178 The familiar case of Pennoyer v. Neff held that
territorial presence was a precondition for a court to exercise personal
jurisdiction.179 Professor Joseph Beale has had the most significant and
enduring impact as the intellectual leader of the traditional “territorial”
thought in conflict of laws. To Beale, law had to “apply to everything
and must exclusively apply to everything within the boundary of its
jurisdiction.”180 This is the famous “vested” rights theory, prominently
codified in the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws. For instance, the
Restatement primarily determined applicable tort law based on “where
the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort [took]
place,”181 while determining applicable contract law principally based
on where the contract was accepted.182
2. Modern Conceptions of Territorial Sovereignty
A comprehensive theory in line with strict territorialism began
to crack in the early twentieth century with the acceleration of crossborder activities that forced territorially tethered laws to produce
results that were “undeniably arbitrary and verged on the bizarre.”183
The rise of legal realism, in particular, exposed the formalistic account
as intellectually rotten and practically infeasible, setting up an
intellectual vacuum for modern conceptions of territorial sovereignty to
take shape.184
Against this backdrop, strictly territorial rules were gradually
relaxed over the course of the twentieth century in favor of more flexible

177. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 588 (1897) (rejecting application of Louisiana law to
a contract “made and to be performed within the State of New York”).
178. Buxbaum, Territoriality, supra note 173, at 632 (“Statehood is articulated by reference to
a particular geographic territory; jurisdiction, in the sense of a sovereign’s authority over persons
or events, by reference to their location within that territory.”).
179. 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877).
180. 1 JOSEPH BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4.12 (1935); see also Kermit
Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2455 (1999)
(“Law, for Beale, was fundamentally territorial, supreme within a jurisdiction but generally
powerless outside it.”).
181. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (AM. LAW INST. 1934).
182. KERMIT ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS 10 (2d ed. 2015).
183. Roosevelt, supra note 180, at 2458.
184. Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1282–84 (1989).
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conceptions of territoriality.185 Various modern strands of territorial
sovereignty rejected categorical rules derived solely from raw territorial
contact and embraced a more flexible approach taking into account the
location of the harm.186
Strict territoriality’s demise in judicial jurisdiction is a story
familiar even to scholars with no particular love for personal
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in 1945 relaxed the personal
jurisdiction standard to a flexible “fair play and substantial justice” test
in International Shoe v. Washington,187 laying the theoretical
groundwork for Shaffer v. Heitner to formally overturn Pennoyer v.
Neff.188
A revolution swept across the field of conflict of laws as well,
accommodating a theory of “state interest” that could exist outside of
strict territorial connection between the state and the individual.
Moving away from the First Restatement’s teachings, “modern”
conflicts scholars embraced “a flexible, case-by-case approach to choiceof-law problems that focused on state interests.”189
Various strands of federal extraterritoriality doctrines
developed in the middle of the twentieth century similarly repudiated
raw territorial contact as the sole basis to determine the reach of law.
The movement had already started in 1927, when the Supreme Court
distinguished United States v. Sisal Sales Corp. from American Banana
despite nearly identical facts.190 A full-scale abandonment of strict
territorialism can be traced to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit’s 1945 decision in Alcoa, where Judge Learned Hand dispensed
with the American Banana test and, in its place, articulated an “effects”
test: conducts occurring outside the territory of the United States were
prohibited by the Sherman Act “if they were intended to affect imports
185. Buxbaum, Territoriality, supra note 173, at 636; Dodge, International Comity, supra note
25.
186. William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for
Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 124–27 (1998).
187. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that a state court can
exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant if he has “certain minimum contacts with it such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice”). For a commentary reflecting on the impact of International Shoe, see Linda J. Silberman,
“Two Cheers” for International Shoe (and None for Asahi): An Essay on the Fiftieth Anniversary of
International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 755, 758 (1995).
188. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 206 (1977); see also Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v.
Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 62–79 (1978) (explaining the doctrinal shift
leading up to Shaffer).
189. Hillel Y. Levin, What Do We Really Know About the American Choice-of-Law Revolution?,
60 STAN. L. REV. 247, 251 (2007) (reviewing SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OFLAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (2006)).
190. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 275–76 (1927).
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and did affect them.”191 This more flexible conception of territoriality is
reflected in the influential Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law’s five bases for the exercise of legislative jurisdiction: “territorial,
national, protective, passive personality, and universal jurisdiction.”192
It is under this rubric in the next Section that I evaluate a possible
territorial sovereignty claim that offshore financial havens may raise.
B. Could Corporate Domicile Trigger an Authority to Legislate?
Of the five bases to exercise legislative jurisdiction recognized by
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, only two potentially
implicate the issue at hand: national and territorial.193
Territorial theory allows a nation state to exercise jurisdiction
over any conduct committed in whole or in part within the state’s
borders and any action taking place outside the territory that has a local
impact.194 While the offshore financial haven’s territorial contact with
a corporate entity—ranging from the physical filing of the incorporation
documents to maintaining a mailbox within the physical territory of the
jurisdiction—may provide a possible claim under this theory, this
argument is unavailing because the relevant entity’s contact with the
jurisdiction is largely metaphysical in the sense that the conduct
potentially giving rise to a legal claim does not physically take place in
offshore jurisdictions. While the territorial theory recognizes a right to
legislate based on the effects felt within the jurisdiction,195 this doctrine
also does little work here given that corporate domicile is irrelevant for
tracking the location of potential harm arising out of corporate

191. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945); see also
id. at 443 (“[A]ny state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for
conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends.”).
192. Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 98, at 1244 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 402 (AM. LAW INST. 1987)).
193. Universal jurisdiction concerns jurisdiction over heinous crimes. See Brilmayer & Norchi,
supra note 98, at 1244; Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66
TEX. L. REV. 785, 839 (1988). Protective jurisdiction generally concerns national security. See
Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 98, at 1245. Finally, passive personality concerns protection of the
state’s nationals abroad and is generally inapplicable outside of certain criminal law contexts. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. g(AM. LAW INST. 1987) (noting that
passive personality jurisdiction “has not been generally accepted” for ordinary torts or crimes);
Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 98, at 1245.
194. See Lea Brilmayer, Liberalism, Community, and State Borders, 41 DUKE L.J. 1, 7 (1991)
(illustrating the broad exercise of jurisdiction under the territorial theory by using U.S. antitrust
law as an example).
195. Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 98, at 1245. The impact theory of territoriality, also
referred to as the “effects principle” of jurisdiction, most famously underpins the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws.
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activities.196 For instance, a U.S. retiree that invested in a fraudulent
investment package sold by a Bahamian fund managed by investment
managers in San Francisco will presumably still have the loss felt in
the United States, because that is where the capital and persons
interested are located.
Nationality theory is trickier.197 The theory holds that a nation
state may exercise jurisdiction respecting “any actions committed
beyond its territory by one of its own nationals.”198 Corporate entities
domiciled in offshore financial havens may be understood as “nationals”
of those jurisdictions, similar to how a nation state may regulate the
conduct of its citizens for conduct committed outside of its territory.
This view would impute nationality to corporate entities based
on the entity’s place of incorporation. The obvious advantage of this
method is the creation of a bright-line rule.199 Enhanced predictability,
indeed, is one of the principle arguments that underlie the internal
affairs doctrine, which instructs courts to apply the law of the state of
the entity’s place of incorporation to govern “internal” affairs between
the entity’s shareholders and the managers.200 It is also important to
acknowledge that corporations were once conceptualized as if they were
natural persons based on their places of incorporation. Classically, a
corporation was conceived as “an artificial person, coming into existence
through creation by a sovereign power.”201 This early Anglo-American
conception of corporate entities dominated court cases during the
nineteenth century. As explained by the Massachusetts Supreme Court

196. As Professor Curtis Bradley notes, the territorial category allows a nation to regulate
“conduct within its territory as well as foreign conduct that has substantial effects or intended
effects in its territory.” Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 323, 323.
197. This is particularly the case because the nationality principle as applied to corporate
entities has been unsettled for decades. See William Laurence Craig, Application of the Trading
with the Enemy Act to Foreign Corporations Owned by Americans: Reflections on Fruehauf v.
Massardy, 83 HARV. L. REV. 579, 589 (1970) (“The international law principles for determining the
nationality of corporations are unsettled.”).
198. Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 98, at 1245.
199. As recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, it would be difficult to structure internal
corporate governance rules without the certainty afforded by a bright-line standard like
incorporation. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982):
The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only
one State should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—
matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and its current
officers, directors, and shareholders—because otherwise a corporation could be faced
with conflicting demands.
200. Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate Internal Affairs, 48 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 161–63 (1985).
201. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343, 343 (1947).
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in the seminal case of Bergner & Engel Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus, “[A]
corporation has its domicile in the jurisdiction of the state which created
it, and, as a consequence, that it has not a domicile anywhere else.”202
But those were also the days when the place of incorporation
“was indicative of a real and meaningful connection between the
corporation and the authorizing state.”203 This is no longer the case, as
the dominance of the internal affairs doctrine in the twentieth century
rendered the place of incorporation largely irrelevant for deducing an
actual territorial relationship between the corporation and the state.204
Absent some level of real economic activity taking place in offshore
financial havens,205 it is difficult to support the proposition that offshore
jurisdictions can exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over matters
“external” to the corporate form.206
This principle is easy enough to appreciate when comparing the
difference between a natural person’s domicile and a corporation’s
domicile. Domicile of a natural person is a territorial relationship
between the state and the individual.207 Generally speaking, the
domicile concept establishes an individual’s legal “headquarters” that
in turn regulates a host of bundled rights between the individual and
the government unit, including state taxes, voting rights, and
education.208 Domicile of natural persons generally requires extended
202. 51 N.E. 531, 532 (Mass. 1898); see also Tung, supra note 28, at 54 (“Corporate law had
only a territorial effect, and a corporation existed only within the borders of the sovereign that
created it.”). This understanding is also reflected in the Restatement (First) of Conflicts of Laws,
largely mirroring the views of its author, Joseph Beale. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 41 (AM. LAW INST. 1934); 1 BEALE, supra note 180, § 41.1.
203. Linda A. Mabry, Multinational Corporations and U.S. Technology Policy: Rethinking the
Concept of Corporate Nationality, 87 GEO. L.J. 563, 587 (1999).
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 cmt. l (AM. LAW INST. 1971);
Goldsmith, Interest Analysis, supra note 30, at 602 n.32; see also Julian Arato, Corporations as
Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 275 (2015) (explaining in the international investment law
context that “the corporation’s flexible form affords the multinational business enterprise
significant leeway to acquire treaty protection for its contracts with foreign sovereigns”); Tung,
supra note 28, at 33–36 (explaining the rise of the internal affairs doctrine). Indeed, as others have
argued, the internal affairs doctrine is said to be the foundation of jurisdictional competition in
U.S. corporate law. See Vincent S.J. Buccola, States’ Rights Against Corporate Rights, 2016
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 595, 636.
205. I am not suggesting that this would be impossible. The point, rather, is that offshore
financial havens are currently used precisely to “provide protection from national regulation and
taxation without the need to physically relocate to the host country.” Palan, Commercialization,
supra note 38, at 163.
206. Cf. Frederick A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 111 RECUEIL
DES COURS 1, 97 (1964) (“No country could so provide without contravening the paramount
principle of international jurisdiction, i.e. the requirement of a close connection between the
legislating State and the subject-matter of the legislation.”).
207. Goldsmith, Interest Analysis, supra note 30, at 600.
208. Id. at 600.
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physical presence in the place and specific intent to make that
jurisdiction home.209 It is because of this unique relationship between
the individual and the government unit that state courts principally
deduce “state interest” in terms of the domicile of noncorporate litigants
in domestic choice of law cases.210 Indeed, in a large number of domestic
choice of law disputes, a court “simply determines the domicile of the
plaintiff and the defendant and then assigns to each party the law of
that domicile in ascertaining each state’s interest in applying its
laws.”211
Corporate domicile, by contrast, is a contract used to establish
the legal relations between members “internal” to corporate entities.212
Indeed, mainstream corporate law scholars conceptualize corporate law
as standard-form default rules produced by states.213 It is for this reason
that while half of Fortune 500 companies call Delaware their juridical
home, only two of them operate their physical headquarters in the
state.214 As visitors to Wilmington, Delaware will quickly realize, the

209. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 16, 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
210. See, e.g., John Bernard Corr, Interest Analysis and Choice of Law: The Dubious
Dominance of Domicile, 1983 UTAH L. REV. 651, 653 (“[I]nterest analysis assumes that states have
special interests in litigation that affects persons who are domiciled or residing within their
borders.”). State interest is a loaded term. In domestic choice of law cases, state interest refers to
a prima facie claim that a state’s law (e.g., New York law) should apply in a case connected to more
than one state (e.g., New York and Connecticut). See Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the
Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 392, 394 (1980) [hereinafter Brilmayer, Legislative
Intent]. Interest analysis, a related term developed by Professor Brainerd Currie, is one intimately
familiar to modern conflict of laws teachers. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963). I use the term not because I follow all of Currie’s theoretical approaches,
many of which have been thoroughly discredited. See Lea Brilmayer, What I Like Most About the
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts, and Why it Should not be Thrown out With the Bathwater, 110
AJIL UNBOUND 144, 145 n.5 (2016); John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State’s Interest in
Protecting its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173, 175 (1981). But the term captures an important
theoretical advancement—that law is not an objectively existing entity deduced by territorial
postulates, as Joseph Beale had his contemporaries believe in the early twentieth century, but
rather that the law is a tool of social policy. See Roosevelt, supra note 180, at 2461. I share this
premise with more modern writers. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, The Myth of the “Unprovided-For”
Case, 75 VA. L. REV. 1045 (1989).
211. Goldsmith, Interest Analysis, supra note 30, at 601; see Corr, supra note 210, at 654
(“[T]he interest of a state other than that in which a party is domiciled may prevail, but it is far
more common for the interest of a domiciliary state to dominate.”).
212. Tung, supra note 28, at 35–36.
213. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 2 (1991) (“The corporate code in almost every state is an ‘enabling’ statute. An
enabling statute allows managers and investors to write their own tickets, to establish systems of
governance without substantive scrutiny from a regulator.”).
214. See BRUNER, supra note 3, at 181.
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juridical home of corporate entities can look like nothing more than a
small mailbox in a warehouse-like building.215
Incorporating in an offshore jurisdiction is not so different.
Ugland House, an unassuming building located in Georgetown,
Cayman Islands, is home to nearly nineteen thousand corporate
entities, often “participants in investment activities, such as those
related to hedge funds or private-equity funds, and structured finance
activities, such as securitization or aircraft finance.”216 The house drew
international headlines in 2008 with then-presidential candidate
Barack Obama’s assessment that the building was “either the biggest
building or the biggest tax scam on record.”217 A U.S. government
investigative report later revealed that the sole occupant of Ugland
House is a law firm that serves as a registration office. Ninety-six
percent of the entities registered in the office were classified as
exempted entities under Cayman Islands law, meaning that they are
generally prohibited from carrying out domestic business within the
Cayman Islands.218 This account is confirmed by other sources, as well.
For instance, a recent study found that of the 25.5 percent of hedge
funds legally registered in the Cayman Islands, only 0.3 percent of the
funds were physically managed from the Cayman Islands.219
The fact that “exempted” or “excepted” entities are involved in
an offshore financial transaction should matter considerably when a
judge decides whether U.S. regulatory law ought to apply to a case with
both a domestic and a foreign fact pattern. For instance, if a securities
transaction’s only nondomestic connection is the fact that it was offered
by an exempt entity registered in the Bahamas, there is little reason
why the judge should decline to apply federal securities law on grounds
that the transaction was completed “extraterritorially” and thus outside
215. A small humdrum office on North Orange Street in Wilmington, Delaware is the legal
headquarters to 285,000 separate businesses, including American Airlines, Apple, Bank of
America, and Wal-Mart, among thousands of other entities. See Leslie Wayne, How Delaware
Thrives as a Corporate Tax Haven, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
07/01/business/how-delaware-thrives-as-a-corporate-tax-haven.html
[https://perma.cc/FRS29QXP].
216. GAO REPORT, supra note 34, at 3.
217. KOEN BYTTEBIER, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ORDER 264 (2017)
(citation omitted).
218. GAO REPORT, supra note 34, at 3, 12–13. It is perhaps for this reason that courts in the
interstate conflicts cases did not accord weight to corporate domicile as triggering state interests,
even as courts were willing to accept domicile of natural persons as triggering state interests. See
Goldsmith, Interest Analysis, supra note 30, at 609–16.
219. See Michael Brocard & Francois-Serge Lhabitant, A Primer on the Tax Framework of
Offshore and Onshore Hedge Funds, EDHEC BUS. SCH. 3–4 (June 13, 2016),
https://www.edhec.edu/sites/www.edhec-portail.pprod.net/files/publications/pdf/edhec-workingpaper-a-primer-on-the-tax-framework-f_1467203960443-pdfjpg [https://perma.cc/QR6L-HACZ].
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of the reach of the Exchange Act. To rule otherwise would be to enable
private entities to contractually opt out of securities fraud—something
expressly prohibited by the language of the statute that bars any
“condition, stipulation, or provision binding . . . to waive compliance”
with the regulation.220
It is perhaps because the legal residence of business entities
need not align with where those entities actually operate that federal
legislation aimed at regulating corporate entities traditionally looked
to the control and ownership of the entities as opposed to where the
entity was formed. This method of imputing corporate nationality
traces its origin to early twentieth-century federal statutes enacted to
establish a jurisdictional basis for subjecting corporations to U.S. law.221
Thus, for instance, national security laws adopted by Congress during
and after World War I established restrictions on foreign ownership of
firms in key strategic industries, defining corporate nationality
“primarily by reference to the nationality of a firm’s shareholders, and
in some cases, its officers and directors.”222 Moreover, the Export
Administration Act of 1979, which prohibited U.S. companies from
participating in the Arab boycott of Israel, defined U.S. companies
broadly to include foreign affiliates that are “controlled in fact” by U.S.
persons.223 These cases, of course, do not necessarily indicate a uniform
approach adopted by Congress. Rather, they show that laws enacted to
regulate the conduct of corporate entities are often “determined by the
place from which the corporation is controlled.”224
To be sure, there is an inherent difficulty in imputing “interest”
on a juridical entity—the nation state. While it is easy to
anthropomorphize the state to advance one’s view on what types of
sovereign interest ought to count, such an effort is bound to break down
under serious intellectual pressure. This is not necessarily because

220. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2012).
221. Mabry, supra note 203, at 582, 584–86.
222. Id. at 586. A paradigmatic example is the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 12, 44 Stat. 1167
(repealed 1934) (requiring the licensing of all radio station owners and limiting the award of
licenses to U.S. citizens, with corporate citizenship being defined as corporate entities whose
officers or directors were U.S. nationals and that had eighty percent of their stock owned by U.S.
citizens).
223. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 16, 93 Stat. 503 (1979) (expired
1994); Mabry, supra note 203, at 582 n.78. These tests, of course, are not without downsides. For
instance, as Mabry suggests, “Discerning the identity and nationality of persons or entities that
have the power to influence key corporate decisions is becoming increasingly difficult.” Mabry,
supra note 203, at 590.
224. Craig, supra note 197, at 589.
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state interest is purely objective225 but because there are underlying
international norms and enforcement constraints that define the
current world order.226
Similarly, my argument does not hinge on whether an offshore
jurisdiction would subjectively assess that it has an interest in applying
its law to a range of disputes external to the corporate entity domiciled
in that jurisdiction. After all, it is no secret that the earliest forms of
modern tax havens deliberately adapted strategies aimed to attract
incorporation business to increase local government revenue.227 Such
an argument is unpersuasive.228 Consider an analogy from the domestic
context. In the United States, Delaware derives a substantial portion of
its government revenue from competing (successfully) in the market for
corporate registration.229 But very few would argue that this revenue
interest requires applying Delaware law for state regulatory law (e.g.,
state antitrust law) involving Delaware corporations. Delaware’s
requirement that corporations wishing to opt into Delaware corporate
law possess a physical mailbox within the state does not alter this
equation.230 Unbridled subjective interest of sovereigns in the
international arena should be reined in not because sovereign interest
is necessarily objective but because it is functionally constrained by a
multijurisdictional system.
To be clear, my goal here is not to be the jury in resolving
“conflicts” when at least two competing jurisdictions can assert
legitimate authority to prescribe the same conduct. The transnational
nature of modern commerce necessarily produces instances where
225. For a discussion on the subjective and objective ways to construct the concept of state
interest, see LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 98–103
(1991); Lea Brilmayer, The Other State’s Interests, 24 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 233, 240–43 (1991);
Roosevelt, supra note 180, at 2481, 2485–86.
226. For a general discussion, see Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting:
Enforcement in Domestic and International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 272 (2011).
227. R.A. JOHNS, TAX HAVENS AND OFFSHORE FINANCE: A STUDY OF TRANSNATIONAL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 20 (1983).
228. It is entirely possible that offshore financial havens, when asked, would express an
interest in governing particular cross-border transactions. At least theoretically, this increases the
fees that the governments of these jurisdictions can extract from entities attempting to evade
assortments of otherwise applicable laws by their home jurisdictions.
229. Indeed, Roberta Romano’s seminal work on corporate charter competition between states
depends on the assumption that franchise taxes represent a substantial source of state revenue.
Romano, supra note 89, at 280. This assumption may not universally hold. See Marcel Kahan &
Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002).
230. Under Delaware law, a corporate entity need not conduct its business in the state to call
Delaware its legal domicile. Rather, it need only file paperwork, pay a franchise tax, and hire a
registered agent who “must have a physical street address in Delaware.” How to Form a New
Business Entity, DEL. DIVISION CORPS., https://corp.delaware.gov/howtoform.shtml (last visited
Sept. 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/YCR5-6XPP].
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conduct in one jurisdiction affects more than one jurisdiction. For
instance, the seminal case of Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California
involved the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act to various
reinsurance companies in the United Kingdom that allegedly conspired
to harm U.S. consumers.231 Similarly, it is entirely conceivable that
some form of economic activity occurs in offshore jurisdictions for
certain forms of cross-border commercial transactions. These are
situations where an extraterritorial application of federal regulatory
statutes may affect other jurisdictions’ interests in regulating their
own, which can generate the types of regulatory retaliation that the
presumption against extraterritoriality is designed to help avoid.232
Regulatory litigation involving corporate entities domiciled in
offshore financial havens, on the other hand, are often situations that
may appear at first to involve the interest of multiple jurisdictions in
which only one jurisdiction actually has the authority to prescribe a
particular conduct.
C. Jurisdictional Competition and Regulatory Arbitrage:
A Reassessment
Even disregarding foreign sovereign interests, arguments in
favor of international regulatory competition facilitated by territorially
tethered domestic rules do not completely lose their intellectual appeal.
When viewing laws as “products,”233 the source of those “products” does
not necessarily alter the efficiency gain envisioned by these accounts.234
That is, whether a rule governing a financial transaction is produced
entirely by a private organization (e.g., International Swaps and
Derivatives Association),235 a state (e.g., New York law), or a foreign
sovereign (e.g., Cayman Islands law), private choice enables private
entities to make welfare-enhancing transactions between consenting
parties.
231. 509 U.S. 764, 769–80 (1993).
232. Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: A Postscript on
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 213, 215, 220 (1993); Weintraub, supra
note 97, at 1800.
233. Romano, supra note 89, at 225–27.
234. Although the term “efficiency” is often used in unmoored and inconsistent ways in legal
scholarship, I use the term generically to refer to the concept of “achieving a maximum value of
output from a given value of inputs.” George J. Stigler, Law or Economics?, 35 J.L. & ECON. 455,
458 (1992).
235. For an excellent primer on the transnational private regulation of over-the-counter
derivatives, see Gabriel V. Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Assessing Transnational Private
Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market: ISDA, the BBA, and the Future of Financial Reform, 54
VA. J. INT’L L. 9 (2013).
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Theoretically, therefore, offshore corporate form delimiting the
application of federal statutes can be conceptualized as an emerging
virtual space built by transnational private contracts enabling private
entities to opt out of otherwise mandatory rules.236 These spaces are in
part built by domestic legal rules enabling private entities to accrete
growing influence over cross-border economic transactions, under the
doctrinal framework of judicial modesty and international comity.237
Indeed, functionally, allowing private entities to opt out of
mandatory domestic laws through offshore incorporation mirrors “legal
regime shopping” through the insertion of choice of law clauses in
private contracts.238 The latter, which is now a ubiquitous companion to
cross-border commercial transactions and increasingly enforced by both
national courts and private arbitration houses, effectively allows
private entities to “legal regime shop” without establishing any
territorial connection with the preferred jurisdiction.239 Importantly,
recent U.S. court jurisprudence in many cases allows private entities to
opt out of a range of otherwise mandatory statutes by contractually
stipulating to be governed by foreign law.240 Both mechanisms—
offshore corporate domicile and private contracts—allow private
entities to opt out of bundles of local rules without physically exiting
that jurisdiction. Theoretically, the supporters for this line of “private
choice” approaches tend to reason that choice enables private entities
236. Corporate structuring in the transnational context, to a certain extent, may be
intellectually grounded in neoliberalist thought that tends to support “particular market
imperatives” against “political intervention.” David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction:
Law and Neoliberalism, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (2014). As Professor David Grewal explains,
neoliberalism, in both domestic and transnational contexts,
privileges relations of sociability and mistrusts those of sovereignty, since (on its own
account at least) the latter are distorted and corrupted by power in a way the former
are not. Instead, neoliberals place their faith in those activities that people undertake
as individuals choosing to participate in broader structures of social life.
DAVID SINGH GREWAL, NETWORK POWER: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF GLOBALIZATION 247 (2008).
237. See, e.g., Brilmayer, New Extraterritoriality, supra note 108, at 656 (critiquing the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Morrison as being littered with “pretensions to judicial modesty”).
Interestingly, the contemporary private governance of transnational commercial activities has also
been expressly conceptualized as “offshore” or “virtual spaces.” See ALEC STONE SWEET & FLORIAN
GRISEL, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: JUDICIALIZATION, GOVERNANCE,
LEGITIMACY 35 (2017) (describing a transnational private arbitral governance of transnational
business as a “space” that makes “no sovereignty claims over people or territory”).
238. See ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 1–12 (2009); Erin A. O’Hara
& Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1152–
57 (2000).
239. See Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Larry E. Ribstein, Preemption and Choice-of-Law
Coordination, 111 MICH. L. REV. 647, 692 (2013) (“For many types of contracts today, courts
routinely and nearly uniformly enforce choice-of-law clauses.”).
240. Id. at 691–92.
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to be governed by law that best suit their needs. As an added benefit, it
may encourage competition between jurisdictions to produce innovative
law.241
I am skeptical of these views because normative accounts that
focus on effectuating private choice and efficiency—a predominant focus
of private law scholarship242—are often dependent on the view that
regulatory laws serve no social purpose.243 At the very least, there are
reasons to cast doubt on this viewpoint, given that private benefits and
costs may not necessarily align with social benefits and costs.244 Tax
incentives, for instance, may induce private entities to opt into an
offshore jurisdiction’s legal regime, even when this structure may not
be desirable from the general public’s standpoint.245
Even assuming efficiency gains attributable to private entities’
ability to opt out of a set of otherwise mandatory laws, the jurisdictional
competition theory holds less persuasion when private transactions
tend to impose externalities on third parties.246 The lack of
externalities, fatally, is an assumption largely shared by proponents of
jurisdictional competition, who owe their intellectual roots to the
Tiebout model. The model, developed by economist Charles Tiebout in
a 1956 article,247 posits that competition among cities for mobile
individuals results in the efficient supply of local public goods by those
241. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 238, at 5–12. The private choice rationale is also
prominently advocated in the field of securities regulation. For seminal accounts, see Stephen J.
Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities
Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998).
242. See Grewal & Purdy, supra note 236, at 15 (“[P]rivate-law scholarship has largely
organized itself around the concept of efficiency, whether devising efficiency-enhancing reforms or
debating the correct definition of efficiency and the appropriate scope of efficiency concerns.”).
243. Professor Joel Trachtman makes this observation in the securities law context.
Trachtman, supra note 22, at 25–26 (arguing that issuer choice-based theories to securities
regulation “are dependent on an assumption that securities regulation serves no social purpose:
that there is no externality worthy of being internalized by regulation”).
244. Proponents for leaving private commercial transactions entirely to private bargaining
tend to underappreciate that there are social impacts of private transactions that are not
necessarily internalized by contracting parties. See RICHARD R.W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE,
SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS 58
(2013) (explaining in the racial restrictive covenants context that “social impacts . . . are not
necessarily internalized by the initial contracting parties”).
245. See Moon, Tax Havens, supra note 58, at 1093–94.
246. Externalities is a loaded concept in both economics and law. For my purposes, I refer to
the range of costs and benefits borne by society at large, other than those engaged in private
transactions. For a seminal account of externalities, see Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of
Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348 (1967).
247. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
Under the Tiebout model, the threat of physical exit from the state incentivizes states to provide
public goods, including the bundle of laws imposed on its subjects.
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cities. While advancing the debate considerably, the Tiebout model, like
many economic theories, unrealistically presupposes the absence of
externalities.248
Thus, even from an efficiency standpoint, the gains envisioned
by proponents of international regulatory competition are empirically
unproven.249 In regulatory theory, the mandatory nature of certain
statutes250—including antitrust, most securities regulation, and
practically all criminal law—exists “where the regulated person does
not absorb all of the effects, adverse or beneficial, of his or her action.”251
As explained by Professor Joel Trachtman, “[T]he mandatory nature of
a law is an indicator, and is perhaps the best evidence, that the law
addresses externalities in the private sector that would ordinarily be
expected to translate into interstate externalities.”252 Indeed, as
248. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional
Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 231–32 (1997)
(“The Tiebout model unrealistically assumes the absence of externalities . . . . [I]ndividual actions
often have external effects. This occurs whenever one’s actions impact on the interests of others
and one fails to account for such impact.”); Trachtman, supra note 22, at 27 (“[T]he Tiebout model
depends on a number of assumptions, including the absence of externalities . . . .”).
249. Indeed, even in the domestic context, “[a] number of economists have also advocated
general legal restrictions on private agreements to deal with undesirable externalities.” Richard
R.W. Brooks, Credit Past Due, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 994, 1017 (2006) (collecting sources).
250. For instance, certain federal regulatory statutes, including the Securities Act of 1933,
expressly prohibit parties from avoiding liability through direct contractual waiver. See, e.g.,
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2012) (“Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding
any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this [subchapter] or
of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void.”).
251. Trachtman, supra note 22, at 17. Mandatory structural rules imposed by the state may
also be designed to solve coordination problems endemic to certain business transactions. See, e.g.,
Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1808
(1998) (“That bankruptcy systems solve a coordination problem rather than regulate the substance
of transactions accounts for some of the distinctions between bankruptcy and commercial law
generally . . . . Structural rules of the game must be mandatory or the game cannot be played at
all.”).
252. Trachtman, supra note 22, at 6. To be sure, one’s view on how “mandatory” a set of rules
ought to be is undoubtedly influenced by his or her view on whether and to what extent domestic
laws are infected by the rent-seeking behavior of various interest groups. This is the influential
public-choice theory that in part motivates the private-choice-driven approach to regulatory law.
See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 1 (1991):
[W]e cannot simply take for granted that the legislature represents the public interest.
Realistically, we must also consider the possibility that a statute represents private
rather than public interests, because of the undue influence of special interest groups.
Alternatively, a statute may fail to represent any identifiable “public” interest because
the public itself is too fragmented to generate any coherent public policy.
For important work applying the public-choice theory to regulatory law governing private
transactions, see O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 238; Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by
Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245 (1993); and Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, State Regulation
of Electronic Commerce, 51 EMORY L.J. 1 (2002). While there are surely domestic laws that reflect
this premise, that generalization does not stand up to serious scrutiny as a universal theory. It
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Professor Robert Wai reminds us, “[T]he policy goals of private law
include social regulation: to provide public goods, to correct for market
failure, and to contribute to social deterrence.”253
Efficiency is wonderful, but not at the cost of accepting a
watered-down conception of the law. Bankruptcy law, for instance, may
be conceptualized as a set of rules governing the relationship between
the creditor and the debtor.254 But it could also be understood as laws
designed to effectuate certain policy goals that take into account other
stakeholders affected by corporate bankruptcies.255 Securities
regulation may be purely examined as the law governing the
relationship between investors and issuers.256 But it may also be
understood as law designed to deter fraud and assortments of market
failures that have resulted in mass externalities borne by the general
public.257 The list can go on and on.258
The private choice rationale espoused by efficiency-oriented
scholars is particularly hard to justify when legislatures—as in the case
of statutes like civil RICO—include treble damages provisions for
successful private litigants.259 The overcompensation of the plaintiff is
perhaps the clearest indication of the legislature relying on “private
attorneys general” to complement the efforts of public enforcement

seems at least equally plausible that “legislation incorporates the public interest as well as possible
given institutional constraints.” Trachtman, supra note 22, at 16.
253. Robert Wai, Transnational Private Law and Private Ordering in a Contested Global
Society, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 471, 474 (2005).
254. In a seminal piece, Professors Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson famously articulated
the goal of bankruptcy law as enhancing the collection efforts of “those . . . who, outside of
bankruptcy, have property rights in the assets of the firm.” Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H.
Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment
on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 103 (1984).
255. See e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 336, 343 (1993) (arguing that bankruptcy law constitutes “a collection system that determines
the value of a failing business, how to distribute that value among parties whom the failure affects,
and the extent to which affected parties can externalize the costs of failure to others who did not
deal with the debtor”).
256. Mandatory rules imposed by a domestic legal regime, under this view, may be overly
restrictive on welfare-enhancing private transactions. See O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 238, at
1–10.
257. As Professor Merrit Fox observes, “[A]bsent regulation, firms can be expected to disclose
less than is socially optimal.” Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who
Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2551 (1997).
258. Cf. David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626, 659 (2014)
(reviewing THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014)) (“[L]aw structures
not just the particular bargains in capitalism . . . but also the broader social and political setting
of the market.”).
259. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012) (providing that a successful plaintiff under civil RICO “shall
recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit”).
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agencies to effectuate particular legislative aims.260 The United States
famously relies on a diffused system of enforcement mechanisms,
relying on both public regulatory agencies and private litigants to
effectuate legislative aims. This system is in part necessitated by
endemic resource constraints facing agencies like the SEC. Reliance on
public enforcement alone, under this structural design, is unlikely to
detect enough violations of any given statute.261 This is because private
litigants, “through pursuit of their own interests . . . serve larger social
purposes of regulation.”262 This point is critical to understanding the
underappreciated role of private litigants in detecting violations of
public regulatory law. While private litigants often do rely on the
investigative efforts of public agencies like the Securities and Exchange
Commission or the Department of Justice to bring private claims, the
reverse is also true: public regulators, in some cases, decide to bring
enforcement actions following the initiation of private litigation.263 This
should be unsurprising, given that private litigants, in certain
situations, are at an institutional advantage by virtue of possessing
“[t]he best sources of information about private wrongs.”264
The presence of negative externalities associated with certain
private misconduct gives little reason to make regulatory statutes
amenable to private choice,265 under the pretense of being governed by
260. The term “private attorneys general” was coined by Judge Jerome Frank. See Associated
Indus. of New York State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320 U.S.
707 (1943) (“[T]here is nothing constitutionally prohibiting Congress from empowering any person,
official or not, to institute a proceeding involving such a controversy, even if the sole purpose is to
vindicate the public interest. Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney
Generals.”); see also Jill E. Fisch, Federal Securities Fraud Litigation as a Lawmaking
Partnership, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 453, 462 (2015) (“In legislating private securities fraud, Congress
reaffirmed the critical policy considerations that had previously been identified by the Court.
Congress explicitly recognized the importance of private litigation as a supplement to public
enforcement efforts.”).
261. J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law,
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1178 (2012); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of
Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV.
93, 95–96 (2005) (arguing that private litigants in the United States play an important role in
“deterring, detecting, and correcting socially harmful violations of the law”). It is for this reason
that the relatively broad “extraterritorial” regulatory authority enjoyed by public enforcement
agencies in the financial regulation context, see Griffith, supra note 20, at 1329–30, in my view is
insufficient to fully safeguard U.S. interests.
262. Wai, supra note 253, at 474.
263. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer
as Bounty Hunter is not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 223, 231 n.18 (1983).
264. See Glover, supra note 261, at 1154.
265. To be clear, there are good reasons to leave certain areas of the laws—including corporate
law—largely amenable to private choice. These areas tend to be predominantly default laws in
domestic contexts, where the sovereign supplies templates of laws that private entities can opt in
and out of as they see fit. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 213, at 2 (“The corporate code in
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foreign law.266 In particular, a race to the bottom may be enabled by the
phenomenon of “legislative capture,”267 whereby private entities can opt
into a desirable bundle of rules by literally writing the laws of foreign
jurisdiction.268 Perhaps the most salient example is the case of the Cook
Islands in the South Pacific Ocean, a jurisdiction that pioneered laws
in the late 1980s “devised to protect foreigners’ assets from legal claims
in their home countries.”269 The Cook Islands trusts law was written by
Colorado-based lawyer Barry Engel “with Americans in mind.”270 Cook
Islands law, unsurprisingly, offers strict bank secrecy rules and refuses
to recognize or enforce foreign judgments.271 The Cook Islands
government generates revenues in the form of “registration fees, taxes
on trust companies and their employees, and various support
services.”272
Legislative capture is a phenomenon especially vulnerable to the
governments of small offshore jurisdictions looking to convert their
lawmaking authority into staple revenue streams. It is no secret that
interested private parties work intimately with local legislatures in
offshore financial havens. One “offshore magic circle” law firm, for
instance, even advertises “its close working relations with tax haven

almost every state is an ‘enabling’ statute. An enabling statute allows managers and investors to
write their own tickets, to establish systems of governance without substantive scrutiny from a
regulator.”). Regulatory statutes, on the other hand, tend to be precisely the kinds of laws that are
designed to force private actors to internalize costs that are not being fully internalized by private
transactions.
266. As Professor Steven Ratner observes, “[T]he desire of many less developed states to
welcome foreign investment means that some governments have neither the interest nor the
resources to monitor corporate behavior, either with respect to the [multinational corporation’s]
employees or with respect to the broader community.” Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human
Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 462 (2001).
267. James Kwak, Incentives and Ideology, 127 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 253, 256 (2014)
(describing legislative capture as “the ability of industry to use its financial clout to influence
Congress and, indirectly, agencies that are overseen by Congress”).
268. The related phenomenon of “regulatory capture” is a concept well developed in the
economic policy literature. Regulatory capture is broadly understood as the “process through which
special interests affect state intervention in any of its forms, which can include areas as diverse as
the setting of taxes, the choice of foreign or monetary policy, or the legislation affecting R&D.” See
Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 203, 203 (2006).
269. Leslie Wayne, Cook Islands, a Paradise of Untouchable Assets, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/15/business/international/paradise-of-untouchable-assets.html
[https://perma.cc/M5N6-2UD5].
270. Id. (“A Cook official, seeking revenue for the islands, read in The Economist about Mr.
Engel’s firm, which was pioneering the concept of asset protection trusts, and hired Mr. Engel to
help write the 1989 law.”).
271. See Reuben W. Tylor, Effective Firewall Legislation—Cook Islands, 14 TRUSTS &
TRUSTEES 685 (2008) (emphasizing the effectiveness of Cook Islands’ firewall legislation).
272. Wayne, supra note 269.
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governments.”273 Other law firm partners have been members of the
local legislatures of notorious tax havens.274 The transnational publicprivate collaboration that could have catastrophic consequences is not
a mere theoretical inquiry. In a recent case before the Fifth Circuit,
victims of a Ponzi scheme brought an action against the island nation
of Antigua for playing a role in facilitating a $7 billion Ponzi scheme
involving financier Allen Stanford.275 While the suit was thrown out for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, defrauded investors pleaded (with substantial
evidence) that “Antigua accepted numerous loans and other financial
contributions from Stanford and in return provided him with a
significant amount of influence over Antigua generally, and especially
over its financial regulatory sector.”276 While good arguments can be
made about legislative capture lowering the transactional costs for
producing desirable templates of default rules governing private
relations,277 leaving regulatory laws to the hands of captured
lawmakers makes little sense both from a democratic legitimacy
standpoint and from an efficiency standpoint.
D. Advice to Congress and Courts: Toward Sensible
Extraterritoriality
The unterritorial aspects of modern financial transactions
challenge territorially configured domestic laws at their core.278 This
Article has argued that a restrictive approach to construing the
273. John Christensen, Do They Do Evil? The Moral Economy of Tax Professionals, in
NEOLIBERALISM AND THE MORAL ECONOMY OF FRAUD 72, 79 (David Whyte & Jörg Wiegratz eds.,
2016).
274. See id.
275. Frank v. Antigua & Barbuda, 842 F.3d 362, 365–67 (5th Cir. 2016).
276. Frank v. Antigua & Barbuda, No. 3:09-CV-2165-N, 2015 WL 13173102, at *1 (N.D. Tex.
June 26, 2015), rev’d, 842 F.3d 362 (5th Cir. 2016).
277. U.S. corporate law, dominated by Delaware notwithstanding its small size, would be a
paradigmatic example. See, e.g., LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 4
(2007) (describing the “unwritten compact between [Delaware lawyers] and the state lawmakers”
where the Delaware lawmakers regularly “call upon the expertise of the Corporation Law Section
of the Delaware Bar Association to recommend, review, and draft almost all amendments to the
statute”).
278. This problem is not unique to modern finance. For instance, unterritorial aspects of data
challenge territorially defined Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See Jennifer Daskal, The UnTerritoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 326 (2015):
Fourth Amendment rights turn on whether the search or seizure takes place
territorially or extraterritorially . . . . The ease and speed with which data travels across
borders, the seemingly arbitrary paths it takes, and the physical disconnect between
where data is stored and where it is accessed critically test these foundational premises.

Moon_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

50

1/31/2019 8:01 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1:1

geographic scope of federal statutes has created loopholes for
commercial entities to evade important federal regulatory laws.
Correcting this problem necessarily requires a structural
reexamination of our extraterritoriality jurisprudence. This Section
outlines lessons to draw on from the foregoing discussion.
First, determining the scope of federal statutes in the modern
era requires us to refine territorially tethered conceptions of the law
that were developed largely presupposing the link between territorial
contact and a jurisdiction’s lawmaking authority.279 Today, territorial
contact with a particular jurisdiction, even if factually ascertainable,
could misleadingly or arbitrarily track whether that jurisdiction has an
interest in applying its law to a dispute related to that contact. Forming
a feeder fund in the Cayman Islands, for instance, typically entails
maintaining a physical mailbox in the Cayman Islands and hiring a
“dummy director” residing in the Cayman Islands.280 As discussed
above, however, this form of “territorial” contact with the Cayman
Islands does not necessarily trigger the sovereign interest of the
Cayman Islands to regulate conduct involving the feeder fund.
Territorially tethering the scope of domestic statutes is a
particularly undesirable method for regulating modern financial
transactions. Given unprecedented capital mobility and the ubiquity of
online transactions,281 private actors can easily shift the locus of their
transactions outside of the territory of any given jurisdiction.282 When
a transaction takes place either in multiple places or electronically,
fixating on the location of that transaction is bound to result in
arbitrary and inconsistent decisions. At worst, it creates loopholes for
private actors to opt out of mandatory laws of the United States that
are in part designed to safeguard the general public’s interest at
large.283 While territorial contact continues to retain important
279. See supra Section III.A.1.
280. Establishing Investment Funds in the Cayman Islands: Key Considerations, DELOITTE 5
(Nov. 2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/bm/Documents/financial-services/
cayman-islands/establishing-investment-funds-in-the-cayman-islands.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
VMY5-EFEX]. Directors typically do not exist in domestic hedge funds. As John Morley explains,
these “dummy directors” exist in offshore jurisdictions like the Cayman Islands only “because
quirks of law in offshore jurisdictions require it.” Morley, Investment Fund, supra note 70, at 1253.
281. Moon, Tax Havens, supra note 58, at 1089.
282. Brummer, supra note 36, at 515.
283. See Trachtman, supra note 22, at 5–6. Indeed, the existence of negative externalities in
the financial contracting context is relatively well known. See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis, Contracts as
Technology, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 97 (2013) (“Contractual innovations can also generate negative
externalities. The classic example is that of financial contracts which magnify contracting parties’
risk of insolvency and thereby jeopardize their creditors’ solvency. In extreme cases, these kinds
of innovations can throw entire economies into turmoil.”).
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probative value in many interjurisdictional cases, it should not
categorically dictate how we allocate interjurisdictional lawmaking
authority.
Second, we should resist the temptation to isolate policy goals
underlying statutes to determine whether a dispute at hand is
sufficiently “domestic” to warrant the application of federal statutes.284
This is the central methodological defect encouraged by the Morrison
Court’s “focus” test, which instructs courts to search for the “objects of
the statute’s solicitude.”285 For one, instructing courts to decipher the
policy behind a statute is often unhelpful because it is almost never
clear whether a particular statute’s concern “refer[s] to domestic
conduct, domestic effect, or any discernable domestic connection.”286
Statutes, often written in majestically general terms,287 are also
difficult, if not impossible, to discern because many are laden with
multiple (and some conflicting) goals.288 The text of the statute typically
does little to alleviate this problem. As Professor Lea Brilmayer
reminds us, “[I]n the vast majority of cases, legislatures have no actual
intent on territorial reach.”289
To that end, Congress should enact an omnibus statute
expressly overruling Morrison’s interpretive methodology.290 As readily
acknowledged by the Morrison Court, the presumption against
extraterritoriality is a canon of statutory interpretation, and not a

284. Decades of domestic choice of law jurisprudence teaches us that it is unproductive to force
judges to isolate policy goals to determine the reach of statutes that are textually silent in scope.
See, e.g., BRILMAYER, supra note 225 , at 43–107; Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis:
A House Without Foundations, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 459, 459–61 (1985).
285. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 267 (2010).
286. Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 94 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 15 (2014).
287. ROOSEVELT, supra note 182, at 46.
288. Robert A. Katzmann, Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637, 680 (2012) (“It is unreasonable to
expect Congress to anticipate all interpretive questions [about a statute] that may present
themselves in the future.”); see also ROOSEVELT, supra note 182, at 57 (“It is hard to be confident
about exactly what the legislature aimed to achieve, and in fact legislatures probably often have
multiple and perhaps conflicting goals.”).
289. Brilmayer, Legislative Intent, supra note 210, at 393 (emphasis omitted); see also
Symeon C. Symeonides, The Choice-of-Law Revolution Fifty Years After Currie: An End and a
Beginning, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1857 (“[S]tatutes that expressly declare their intended
territorial reach are the exception rather than the rule.”).
290. Examples of omnibus statutes overriding statutory interpretation decisions of federal
courts include “reconciliation statutes, statutory reform efforts, and recodifications.” William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331,
338 (1991).
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constraint on congressional power.291 Thus, Congress could override
Morrison’s interpretive methodology through legislation.292
In lieu of Morrison’s extraterritoriality test, Congress should
institute a more flexible test requiring courts to determine the scope of
federal statutes by contextually and collectively weighing all connecting
factors of each case.293 Under this test, courts can weigh the relevant
connecting factors (e.g., the place of injury, the place of conduct, the
location of the decisionmakers) collectively to determine whether the
United States has a sufficiently significant interest in applying its laws
to a particular dispute at hand.294 This form of “aggregate contacts” test
allows courts to progressively develop case law that adapts to new forms
of cross-border commercial transactions that will continue to challenge
territorially defined laws. While there will inevitably be difficult cases
that require courts to weigh international comity concerns, this type of
test allows courts to at least smoke out “easy cases”—that is, those
where no foreign jurisdiction actually has a sufficient factual nexus
with a particular case to warrant the nonapplication of federal statutes.
As applied to the offshore finance context, for instance, it would allow
courts to avoid the absurd result of a case with overwhelming factual
connections to the United States (and no risk of conflict with foreign
law) being dismissed as an “extraterritorial” transaction.295
To the extent that Morrison’s interpretive methodology remains
good law, it is important to bear in mind that not all hope is lost under

291. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (describing the presumption
against extraterritoriality as a “canon of construction . . . rather than a limit upon Congress’s
power to legislate”).
292. See Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1317 (2014)
(observing that Congress “could alter a judicial construction with a statutory amendment”).
293. One method of doing so would be to instruct courts to apply federal law when the United
States has “the most significant relationship” to a dispute laden with both domestic and foreign
factual elements. This method, of course, is not entirely new. It adopts a version of state law
“extraterritoriality” jurisprudence advocated by prominent scholars in the domestic choice of law
context. See Lea Brilmayer, Hard Cases, Single Factor Theories, and a Second Look at the
Restatement 2D of Conflicts, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1969, 1977 (2015); Brilmayer, supra note 210, at
145.
294. This method of determining the scope of law draws on modern conflict of laws theory that
recommend state courts apply the law of a jurisdiction with the “most significant relationship” to
the case. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145, 188 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
295. Abandoning the Morrison test, for instance, would allow courts to apply U.S. securities
law in cases where significant conduct and harm occurred in the United States. In many ways, the
conduct and effects tests employed by the Second Circuit in securities cases prior to Morrison
reflect one version of what an aggregate contact test might look like. See, e.g., Itoba Ltd. v. Lep
Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) (allowing application of the Exchange Act where an
admixture or combination of conduct and effects suggest “sufficient United States involvement to
justify the exercise of jurisdiction by an American court”).
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the Supreme Court’s new extraterritoriality test. As others have
observed, the “focus” test is a notoriously “standardless concept.”296 The
test, which has also been described as “entirely circular,”297 is summed
up by a federal judge in Pennsylvania adjudicating a civil RICO claim
after Morrison: “Reflexive reference to the term ‘focus’ is unhelpful, as
a statute could be described as concentrated on the activities it
criminalizes . . . or on the entity or person it seeks to protect, or on a
blend of both, and all three options may be accurate depending on
context.”298
A standardless concept, on the flip side, provides opportunities.
In particular, federal statutes devoid of direct Supreme Court precedent
on their extraterritorial scope leave the door open for lower court judges
to broadly construe the “focus” of statutory concerns, thereby enabling
them to more holistically examine the connecting factors of a case.
Consider the Madoff case presided by Judge Rakoff discussed earlier.299
In that case, Judge Rakoff concluded that the “focus” of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code’s fraudulent transfer laws was on the “ ‘property
transferred’ and the fact of its transfer, not the debtor.”300 But the
“focus” of fraudulent transfer laws could be more broadly understood to
concern the improper depletion of a domestic bankruptcy estate’s
assets.301 Indeed, this is what Judge Burton Lifland concluded in a
related case.302 This type of broad construction of a statute’s solicitude,
which doctrinally comports with Morrison’s generic guidance to search
for the “objects of the statute’s solicitude,”303 may help lower courts
avoid reaching results that facilitate the private evasion of important
regulatory statutes. Without congressional override, however, there is
296. Brilmayer, New Extraterritoriality, supra note 108, at 660 (describing the “focus” test as
“a standardless concept”).
297. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Determining Extraterritoriality, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 341, 345–
46 (2014):
[T]he test [is] entirely circular because the purpose of asking whether the claim involves
extraterritoriality is to decide whether to invoke the presumption as a means to
determine Congress’s intent. The circularity of the statutory focus test renders the
presumption against extraterritoriality useless except in easy cases in which none of
the challenged conduct or its effect occurs in the United States.
298. In re Le-Nature’s, Inc., No. 9-1445, 2011 WL 2112533, at *2 n.3 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2011).
299. See supra Section II.B.1.
300. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 513 B.R. 222, 227 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (2012)).
301. See Morrison, Extraterritorial Avoidance, supra note 134, at 169.
302. See Sec. Inv’r Prot. SIPA Liquidation Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 480 B.R.
501, 524 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“As demonstrated by the text and structure of the avoidance and
recovery sections of the Code, their focus is on the improper depletion of the bankruptcy estate’s
assets.”).
303. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 267 (2010).
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only so much that judges can do to come up with sensible
“extraterritoriality” solutions.
CONCLUSION
Capital mobility enabled by technological advancements
enhances the ability of private actors to shift the locus of financial
transactions outside of any particular jurisdiction. Indeed, it is this
mobility that enabled states to compete for corporate charters in the
domestic corporate law context.304 But any claim suggesting that
offshore finance is beyond the regulatory reach of the United States is
exaggerated at best, given that shifting property and human capital
entirely offshore is a significant enterprise. At least in the near future,
nation states “still wield total formal authority over resources and
capabilities in their territories.”305
A cramped vision of domestic interest embraced by recent U.S.
Supreme Court opinions on the spatial reach of federal statutes seems
to romanticize old-fashioned territorialism that received the scholarly
burial it deserved in the mid-twentieth century. But this line of
jurisprudence should be more alarming than ever before. In today’s
world, territorially tethered laws promise not only to produce arbitrary
results but also risk breeding a cottage industry of private regulatory
evasion.306 The emergence of the offshore world, in many cases, has less
to do with respecting the interests of foreign sovereigns than with
private entities bootstrapping foreign sovereign interests in the name
of building and expanding the ever-more unregulated juridical spaces
to conduct modern financial transactions.

304. Tung, supra note 28, at 45–46 (“Legislatures could not afford to . . . driv[e] business out
of state to the detriment of local interests.”).
305. Brummer, supra note 36, at 524.
306. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 79, at 1575 (attributing international tax competition to
the mobility of capital, which resulted from “technological advances as the electronic transfer of
funds and the relaxation of exchange controls”).

